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ABSTRACT 
  How should courts handle interpretive choices, such as when 
statutory text strongly points to one statutory meaning but strong 
evidence of legislative intent suggests a contradictory statutory 
meaning? Courts have addressed this longstanding dilemma 
inconsistently. Sometimes courts follow statutory text over 
contradictory legislative intent; sometimes they do the exact opposite. 
  Though reaching contradictory conclusions, many courts facing 
interpretive choices have argued that the law of interpretation 
provides definitive solutions. This Article argues that the opposite is 
true: the law of interpretation generates, rather than resolves, 
interpretive choices. When this occurs, legally unconstrained judicial 
discretion and extralegal factors, rather than the law of interpretation, 
determine legal meaning. While other scholars have focused on the 
role of judicial discretion in shaping legal meaning, their analyses 
invariably have centered on inherently ambiguous legal texts or 
legislative histories. This Article, by contrast, demonstrates how, in 
cases of interpretive choice, unique features of the law of 
interpretation turn unambiguous legal texts and legislative histories 
into ambiguous statutes. 
  This Article also explores how courts facing interpretive choices 
misrepresent the nature and capacity of the law of interpretation. 
Rather than acknowledging the central role of judicial discretion and 
extralegal considerations, courts argue that the law of interpretation 
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definitively resolves interpretive choices. Rule-of-law values and the 
consonant desire to preserve the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking 
prompt courts to opt for this obfuscatory strategy. This Article, 
however, offers an alternative strategy—transparent justification—and 
explains why the case in favor of transparent justification is much 
stronger than most might imagine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What should a court do when the text of a statute points to one 
statutory meaning but the evidence of legislative intent suggests an 
entirely different statutory meaning? The court could follow the most 
natural reading of the text, but that approach would upset the 
expectations of the enacting legislature. Or it could adopt a reading 
that matches the clearly expressed intent and understanding of the 
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enacting legislature, but to do so would be at odds with the statutory 
text. 
Courts address this longstanding dilemma inconsistently. 
Sometimes courts adhere to statutory text over contradictory 
legislative intent; sometimes they do the exact opposite. Importantly, 
courts grappling with the text-versus-intent dilemma usually argue or 
imply that the law of interpretation provides a definitive solution. 
This Article argues that the opposite is true: the law of interpretation 
generates, rather than resolves, this and similar dilemmas. 
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy1 
serves as a provocative exemplar of this text-versus-intent dilemma, 
as well as the law of interpretation’s failure to resolve the dilemma. In 
Arlington Central, the Supreme Court held that the fee-shifting 
provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)2 
does not permit recovery of expert-witness fees by prevailing 
plaintiffs.3 This interpretation followed uncontroversially from the 
statutory text,4 which states that prevailing parties may be awarded 
“reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.”5 Justice Alito’s 
opinion for the Court emphasized that the statutory text refers only 
to recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs; it says nothing about recovery 
of expert-witness fees.6 Justice Alito bolstered his textual analysis by 
stressing that “costs” is a term of art that is understood to exclude 
expert-witness fees.7 
 
 1. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
 2. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). 
 3. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 304. Arlington Central generated four separate opinions. 
Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 293304. Justice Ginsberg filed a separate opinion, which 
concurred with the result and most of the reasoning of the majority opinion but dissented from 
the majority’s invocation of a clear-statement requirement. Id. at 30408 (Ginsberg, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part). A lengthy dissent authored by Justice Breyer was joined by 
Justices Stevens and Souter. Id. at 30824 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also submitted 
a separate one-paragraph dissent. Id. at 308 (Souter, J., dissenting). This Article will refer to the 
opinion authored by Justice Breyer as the dissenting opinion. 
 4. See id. at 300 (majority opinion) (“[T]he terms of the IDEA overwhelmingly support 
the conclusion that prevailing parents may not recover the costs of experts or consultants.”). 
 5. Id. at 297 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 297, 302. The majority opinion also bolstered its argument with application of a 
clear-statement rule: because Congress passed § 1415 of the IDEA pursuant to its Spending 
Clause powers, the majority asserted that any condition to state acceptance of federal funds 
“must be set out ‘unambiguously.’” Id. at 29596 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Both Justice Ginsburg’s partial concurrence and Justice 
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In response to the majority’s textualist thrust, however, Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion offered an intentionalist parry.8 Despite 
the text,9 Justice Breyer argued, the provision’s legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress understood that the statutory clause in 
question would permit prevailing parties to recover not only 
attorneys’ fees as part of costs, but also expert-witness fees.10 Most 
pertinently, the conference committee’s report stated, “The conferees 
intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ include 
reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses . . . .”11 
Arlington Central offers a stark example of what one 
commentator calls “interpretive choice”—a judicial choice between 
conflicting interpretive approaches or principles.12 Because the 
interpretive choice in Arlington Central is extraordinarily uncluttered, 
I use the case throughout this Article to illustrate and examine 
fundamental features of the law of interpretation.13 
The choice between textualism and intentionalism, of course, is 
just one of many interpretive choices that courts confront. Courts 
 
Breyer’s dissent, however, argued that a clear-statement rule was inapplicable. Id. at 30408 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 31618 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 8. See id. at 30824 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 9. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion acknowledged that a construction permitting 
recovery of expert-witness fees would not represent the most linguistically natural reading of 
the statutory text. Id. at 319. 
 10. Id. at 30913. The dissent also argued that the interpretation of IDEA favored by the 
majority would discourage parents from enforcing their children’s IDEA rights and would 
thereby undermine the statutory purpose of promoting free public education for disabled 
children. Id. at 31316. 
 11. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). In addition to the conference 
committee’s language, the dissent also pointed to several other indicators of legislative intent to 
permit expert-witness fee shifting. See infra text accompanying notes 91–94. 
 12. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000) (defining 
interpretive choice as “the selection of one interpretive doctrine, from a group of candidate 
doctrines, in the service of a goal specified by a higher-level theory of interpretation”). 
 13. Another example involving interpretive choice between clear text and clear, 
diametrically opposed legislative intent is an issue that has been litigated in federal courts. See 
Adam N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”?: Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the 
Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1187–88 (2007). 
The issue arises out of a section of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332(d), 1453 (2006), which grants federal appellate courts the uncommon power to hear 
immediate appeals of federal district court orders regarding remand of class actions to state 
courts. Steinman, supra, at 1187. Unambiguous CAFA statutory text creates a seven-day waiting 
period before a litigant may apply for appellate review. Id. But unambiguous evidence of 
legislative intent—including a key committee report—indicates that Congress intended to create 
a seven-day limitation period for the filing of applications for appellate review. Id. 
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may choose purposive or dynamic interpretive approaches14 and may 
utilize different flavors of a particular interpretive approach. 
Textualism, for example, is not a monolithic approach but rather a 
multiplicity of different approaches using statutory text in different 
ways.15 The same holds true for intentionalism. Courts may choose 
between honoring an actual expression of the legislature’s intent or 
estimating the probable legislative intent regarding an issue that was 
not originally contemplated by the legislature.16 Moreover, below the 
level of general interpretive approaches, courts may choose from a 
diverse array of particularized interpretive canons, maxims, and rules. 
For example, when analyzing statutory text, should a court apply the 
interpretive rule that “all words in a statute must be given effect”17 or 
 
 14. Thus, what should a court do when statutory text suggests one meaning but statutory 
purpose would be frustrated by application of that textual meaning? Compare Caminetti v. 
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (applying a broad, literal meaning deduced from the 
statutory text over a more limited meaning derived from the statutory purpose), with Church of 
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (favoring a limited statutory purpose over 
a broader literal meaning based on statutory text). Should courts interpret statutory terms 
statically, such that their meaning is frozen at the time of enactment, or dynamically, such that 
their meaning shifts over time? Compare People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 150 N.E. 290, 292 (Ill. 
1925) (interpreting a statute statically to read the term “electors” consistently with its meaning 
at the time of the statute’s passage, despite a conflict with its contemporary meaning), with 
Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 114 A. 825, 829 (Pa. 1921) (interpreting a statute dynamically to 
read the term “electors” consistently with its contemporary meaning, despite a conflict with its 
meaning at the time of the statute’s passage). 
 15. For example, as Professor Lawrence Solan emphasizes, courts operating under a 
textualist rubric may choose a plain-meaning approach, which he terms a “definitional” or 
“ordinary” meaning approach. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 2027, 203139 (2005). 
 16. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 70607 
(4th ed. 2007) (discussing actual legislative intent and imaginatively reconstructed legislative 
intent); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 630 (1990) 
(noting that courts using intentionalist interpretation sometimes seek evidence of actual 
legislative intent and other times “‘reconstruct’ the answer the enacting Congress would have 
given if the interpretive issue had been posed directly”). For a paradigmatic example of 
imaginative reconstruction, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Court drew on various indicia of legislative intent to gauge what Congress would 
have intended if it had contemplated the narrow issue before the Court. Id. at 43243. In 
contrast, Arlington Central involved direct evidence of congressional intent on the narrow issue 
before the Court. See supra note 11. 
 17. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (citing the canon against 
surplusage, which holds that courts must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute”). 
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the rule that “a word repugnant to the rest of the statute can be 
ignored”?18 
When faced with interpretive choices, courts vacillate.19 With 
respect to the text-versus-intent dilemma, for example, in one case, a 
court will proclaim, “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the 
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”20 In another 
case, however, the same court will assert a contrary principle: 
“[When] literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters[,] . . . . the 
intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”21 
Similar contradictions appear in choices between other interpretive 
approaches,22 between different versions of the same interpretive 
 
 18. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (stating that the 
canon “requiring a court to give effect to each word ‘if possible’ is sometimes offset by the 
canon that permits a court to reject words ‘as surplusage’ if ‘inadvertently inserted or if 
repugnant to the rest of the statute’” (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 525 (1960))). 
 19. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In 
recent years the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the task of statutory 
interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from historical context, legislative history, 
and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation.”); Frank B. Cross, The 
Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 2001 (2007) 
(concluding that the Supreme Court is “quite pluralist in its methods of statutory 
interpretation”). 
 20. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also infra note 63. 
 21. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also 
infra note 64. 
 22. For example, although courts sometimes enunciate the principle that statutory purpose 
may trump the plain meaning of statutory text, courts also occasionally state that statutory text 
controls even if it would frustrate statutory purpose. Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (“The general words used in the clause . . . , taken by themselves, and 
literally construed, without regard to the object in view, . . . . in many cases . . . would defeat the 
object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. And it is well settled that, in interpreting a 
statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, 
but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law.” 
(first and fourth omissions in original) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 
(1857)) (internal quotation mark omitted)), and United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 
534, 543 (1940) (“[E]ven when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an 
unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has 
followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.” (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 
178, 194 (1922))), with Casey, 499 U.S. at 98 (rejecting the argument that a statute should be 
construed in accordance with its statutory purpose rather than with the literal meaning of its 
text). 
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approach,23 and between fine-grained rules of interpretation.24 
Professor Karl Llewellyn’s legal-realist critique of statutory 
interpretation famously demonstrates that the canons of construction 
are often inconsistent.25 The kinds of inconsistencies that Llewellyn 
identifies are not limited to the canons, however, but instead are 
present even at the level of general interpretive approaches. 
This Article addresses the unique structure of the law of 
interpretation and explains how this structure often renders the law of 
interpretation useless for resolving interpretive choices. The law of 
interpretation combines a grab bag of conflicting injunctive principles 
with an absence of ordering principles. Injunctive principles instruct 
courts on how to interpret statutes. Ordering principles establish 
hierarchies of use for these injunctive principles. Because the law of 
interpretation lacks a hierarchy for ordering its injunctive principles, 
it is incapable of identifying a single legally superior interpretation 
among two or more rival interpretations. Instead, the law of 
interpretation often identifies multiple interpretations of equal legal 
validity. Thus, the law of interpretation not only fails to resolve 
interpretive choices, but in fact accomplishes the exact opposite: it 
generates interpretive choices. When this occurs, elements outside of 
the law of interpretation—generally, legally unconstrained judicial 
discretion and extralegal factors—necessarily determine which among 
multiple legally sanctioned interpretations a court will select. In 
Arlington Central, for example, the Court did not employ textualist 
over intentionalist interpretive principles because the law of 
interpretation so prescribed. Instead, the Court did so because the 
 
 23. The law of interpretation encompasses both plain-meaning and ordinary-meaning 
textualism, and the Supreme Court has used both at different times, or even in different 
opinions in the same case. See Solan, supra note 15, at 203236 (discussing the use of plain-
meaning and ordinary-meaning textualism in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)). 
 24. For example, federal courts may choose between different versions of the same canon 
of construction, such as the rule of lenity. Specifically, the majority opinion in Muscarello v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), cited a narrow version of the rule of lenity applicable only if a 
court “can make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended,’” id. at 138 (quoting 
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)), whereas the dissenting opinion cited a broader 
version of the rule that applies unless “text, structure, and history fail to establish that the 
Government’s position is unambiguously correct,” id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Similarly, 
federal courts may choose from at least three different versions of the avoidance canon. See 
Gilbert Lee, Comment, How Many Avoidance Canons Are There After Clark v. Martinez?, 10 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 193, 20220 (2007) (describing the serious-constitutional-doubts, clear-
affirmative-intention, and lowest-common-denominator canons of avoidance). 
 25. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
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five Justices joining the majority opinion exercised legally 
unconstrained discretion and concluded that statutory text should 
trump legislative intent in that particular case. 
Many other commentators have explored the role of judicial 
discretion in legal interpretation,26 invariably focusing their analyses 
on the inherent ambiguity of legal texts or legislative histories.27 The 
novel argument offered here is that legally unconstrained judicial 
discretion and extralegal factors can dominate legal interpretation 
even when the underlying legal materials—statutory text and 
legislative history—are themselves clear and unambiguous. In other 
words, the law of interpretation not only fails to deal with inherently 
ambiguous statutory material, but it also turns unambiguous statutory 
material into ambiguous statutes. 
Second, this Article focuses on how courts respond to cases that 
present interpretive choices. Simply stated, courts regularly employ 
an avoidance maneuver: they avoid acknowledging that the law of 
interpretation necessitates legally unconstrained choices among 
injunctive interpretive principles and deny that judicial discretion and 
extralegal factors even play a role in resolving interpretive choices. 
Instead, courts routinely contend or imply that the law of 
interpretation imposes ordering principles that establish hierarchies 
of injunctive interpretive principles. Once a court posits or presumes 
that the law of interpretation prefers certain interpretive principles, it 
can cast a particular statutory interpretation—not coincidentally, the 
one chosen by the court—as compelled by the law of interpretation. 
Arlington Central demonstrates this phenomenon. Both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington Central avoided 
acknowledging the role of judicial discretion and extralegal 
 
 26. A recent, thoughtful meditation on judicial discretion lists Professor Ronald Dworkin, 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, and Professor Ahron Barak among the “countless” authors of works 
on “discretion in the judicial process.” A. David Pardo, Judicial Discretion in Talmudic Times 
and the Modern Era, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 429, 430 n.4 (2009). 
 27. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2027, 2034 (2002) (arguing that courts should respond to statutory indeterminacy by 
adopting interpretations that are consistent with the present society’s “enactable political 
preferences” rather than the preferences of the enacting Congress); Amanda Frost, Certifying 
Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 923 (2007) (discussing statutory indeterminacy 
and arguing that courts should be permitted to refer ambiguous statutory-interpretation issues 
back to Congress); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408 
(2003) (discussing how textualist judges should exercise discretion when facing ambiguous 
statutory texts); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (proposing a statutory code of permissible principles of 
interpretation in response to the “inevitable ambiguities” of statutes). 
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considerations in determining the outcome. They did this by 
suggesting that the law of interpretation provided a definitive answer 
to the text-versus-intent dilemma presented by the case. 
Third, this Article explores whether the avoidance maneuver 
offers the optimal response for courts facing interpretive choices. The 
central problem with the avoidance maneuver is that courts 
employing it misrepresent the law of interpretation. In Arlington 
Central, both opinions distorted the law of interpretation because 
both suggested that it favored one interpretive approach—textualism 
or intentionalism—over another. The law of interpretation, however, 
contains no ordering principles that establish a definitive hierarchy 
between textualist and intentionalist interpretive approaches. Instead, 
the law of interpretation sanctions conflicting interpretive principles 
and grants neither approach a definitive legal trump over the other. 
As an alternative to the avoidance maneuver, courts could 
confront interpretive choices with a strategy of transparent 
justification. Under this strategy, courts would admit that the law of 
interpretation generates interpretive choices and would then openly 
explain the extralegal factors motivating them to choose one legally 
valid interpretation over another interpretation of equal legal 
validity. 
Both rule-of-law values and the consonant desire to preserve the 
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking might be seen as counseling in 
favor of the avoidance maneuver and against transparent justification. 
But the rule-of-law justification for the avoidance maneuver is 
surprisingly weak, and the case in favor of transparent justification is 
much stronger than many imagine. Cases presenting interpretive 
choices cannot be decided in accordance with rule-of-law values. The 
avoidance maneuver cannot alter the inescapable reality that judicial 
discretion and extralegal factors will be determinative in these cases. 
Rather than enhancing or even preserving the legitimacy of courts 
and judicial decisionmaking, the avoidance maneuver merely drapes 
judicial discretion in an unconvincing rule-of-law façade. By contrast, 
transparent justification would do no discernible damage to the 
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. Courts using transparent 
justification would confront interpretive choices with candor and 
completeness. Because lawyers, litigants, and attentive segments of 
the general public already comprehend that the law of interpretation 
alone cannot adjudicate interpretive choices, the candor of 
transparent justification would not produce legitimacy-eroding 
effects. 
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Part I explains why the law of interpretation generates, rather 
than resolves, interpretive choices and thus why it permits legally 
unconstrained discretion and extralegal factors to be outcome 
determinative in cases involving interpretive choice. Part II illustrates 
how courts deploy the avoidance maneuver and how they routinely 
claim that the law of interpretation resolves interpretive choices by 
identifying legally superior statutory interpretations. Part III 
addresses the merits and demerits of both the avoidance maneuver 
and transparent justification. Additionally, Part III argues that courts 
should more readily recognize the drawbacks of the avoidance 
maneuver and should be more receptive to using transparent 
justification in cases of interpretive choice.  
I.  THE UNSTRUCTURED AND INTERNALLY CONFLICTED NATURE 
OF THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION 
The law of interpretation sanctions conflicting interpretive 
principles and treats them as hierarchic equals. As a result, the law of 
interpretation generates but cannot resolve interpretive choices. 
Instead, unfettered judicial discretion and extralegal factors resolve 
interpretive choices. 
In Arlington Central, the Justices faced an interpretive choice 
between textualist and intentionalist interpretive principles. Because 
the law of interpretation treats these principles as hierarchic equals, it 
is ultimately incapable of resolving the interpretive choice. Thus, the 
law of interpretation could not have been the decisive element that 
produced the majority and dissenting interpretations of IDEA § 1415. 
Instead, extralegal factors—perhaps the Justices’ substantive policy 
preferences, their personally held philosophies of interpretation, or 
other idiosyncratic factors—resolved the interpretive choice and 
determined the outcome of the case. 
My argument goes beyond the pedestrian point that judicial 
discretion is often the deciding factor in legal interpretation cases. To 
be sure, judicial discretion is the determinative factor when statutory 
materials exhibit inherent ambiguity.28 The argument offered here, 
 
 28. The final contours of statutes with ambiguous text, for example, will be drawn by an 
inescapable exercise of judicial discretion. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 4147 (1994) (arguing that textualist principles do not limit 
judicial discretion because they cannot always clarify ambiguous statutory provisions); John F. 
Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
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however, has nothing to do with cases involving inherent linguistic 
ambiguity or open-textured terminology. To the contrary, I argue that 
legally unconstrained judicial discretion driven by extralegal 
considerations determines outcomes in any case of interpretive 
choice, even when the statutory material itself is relatively free of 
inherent ambiguity or open-textured terminology. 
Thus, in Arlington Central, the relevant fee-shifting provision in 
IDEA § 1415 is marked by a very low degree of ambiguity. The 
statutory text refers only to recovery of “reasonable attorneys’ fees as 
part of the costs.”29 It does not mention expert-witness fees. 
Moreover, “costs” is a term of art that does not include expert-
witness fees.30 The evidence in the record of legislative history is 
equally unambiguous in indicating that Congress intended for the 
words “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to permit 
recovery of expert-witness fees. Principally, the conference report 
stated that “[t]he conferees intend[ed for] the term ‘attorneys’ fees as 
part of the costs’ [to] include reasonable expenses and fees of expert 
witnesses.”31 Despite this lack of inherent ambiguity in the statutory 
materials, legally unconstrained judicial discretion determined which 
of two unambiguous but conflicting meanings prevailed. 
How could the law of interpretation fail to establish a hierarchy 
between textualist and intentionalist interpretive norms? More 
broadly, how could the law of interpretation generate, rather than 
resolve, interpretive choices between interpretive principles? The 
answer lies in the structure—or, perhaps more accurately, the 
antistructure—of the law of interpretation. The law of interpretation 
is not a neatly systematized hierarchy of principles. It is instead a 
disorderly and unstructured grab bag of tools—featuring interpretive 
approaches, canons, and other rules—from which courts may draw to 
suit their needs. The law of interpretation lacks structure because it 
combines a varied and often conflicting body of injunctive interpretive 
principles with an almost complete lack of ordering principles for 
organizing and prioritizing those injunctive principles. The lack of 
ordering principles leaves the law of interpretation without rules for 
 
1648, 1655 (2001) (“Ambiguous language necessarily vests judges with some degree of 
policymaking discretion . . . .”). 
 29. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297 (2006). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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resolving conflicts between injunctive principles, such as opposing 
textualist and intentionalist principles. 
A. Injunctive Principles and Ordering Principles 
The law of interpretation is primarily composed of rules that can 
be labeled injunctive interpretive principles. Injunctive interpretive 
principles resemble commands, directives, or imperatives. They 
instruct or command courts engaged in the interpretive enterprise. 
Courts have developed injunctive interpretive principles at two levels 
of generality. First, at a high level of generality, courts have devised 
and employed different general interpretive approaches.32 Textualism 
and intentionalism, on display in Arlington Central, are the most 
frequently used approaches.33 Purposive and dynamic approaches, 
however, are also regularly employed.34 These different interpretive 
approaches offer courts guidance on the general objectives of the 
interpretive enterprise. Textualist injunctive principles establish that 
when interpreting statutes, courts should strive to discern the 
meaning of the statutes’ enacted and officially adopted words.35 
Intentionalist injunctive principles, by contrast, maintain that courts 
should seek first and foremost to interpret statutes in accordance with 
 
 32. See Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 
594624 (1996) (reviewing the textualist, intentionalist, purposive, and dynamic interpretive 
approaches). 
 33. Frost, supra note 27, at 2 (referring to textualism and intentionalism as “the two most 
widely accepted interpretive theories”); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 
VA. L. REV. 419, 41920 (2005) (naming textualism and intentionalism as the most frequently 
used interpretive methodologies). 
 34. On dynamic interpretation, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 4880. On purposive 
interpretation, see AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 83304 (2005); 
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 11549 (1999); and Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role 
of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 6667 (2002). For arguments that 
pragmatic- or practical-reasoning approaches should perhaps be separate interpretive 
approaches, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 23065 (2008); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 321, 353–62 (1990); and Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation 
Matter?: A Case Study, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 141416 (2000). 
 35. See González, supra note 32, at 596 (“The common thread linking the family of textual 
theories of statutory interpretation is their uniform reliance on the words of statutes as an 
interpretive guide.”); Manning, supra note 33, at 420 (“[T]extualism . . . is associated with the 
basic proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted 
text . . . .”); see also Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 416–17 (2005) 
(arguing that textualism is subtle rather than simplistic and, in the end, is not that different from 
an intentionalist approach). 
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the intent of the legislative body, even if that intent is inconsistent 
with, or imperfectly conveyed by, a statute’s textual provisions.36 
Second, at a lower level of generality, courts have devised and 
employed a long list of injunctive interpretive canons, maxims, 
presumptions, and rules.37 Many canons are meant to assist courts in 
deciphering the meaning of statutory texts.38 Other canons assist 
courts in determining the most probable legislative intent.39 Still other 
canons imbue the law of interpretation with substantive presumptions 
or biases.40 Like the broad interpretive approaches, the narrow 
canons, maxims, and rules instruct courts on how to conduct and 
engage in the interpretive enterprise. For example, one commonly 
used principle explains: “Where general words follow specific words 
in a statutory enumeration, the general words [should be] construed 
to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated 
by the preceding specific words.”41 Another less well-known principle 
instructs courts to interpret ambiguous statutes “to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations” and to “assume that legislators take account of the legitimate 
sovereign interests of other nations when they write American 
laws.”42 
Though the above review traces only the broadest outlines of the 
law of interpretation, it should be clear that the body of injunctive 
interpretive principles is vast and varied.43 In contrast to this body of 
injunctive interpretive principles, the law of interpretation is almost 
completely devoid of ordering principles—rules to order, organize, 
 
 36. ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 14; González, supra note 32, at 605; Steinman, supra note 
13, at 1197. 
 37. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 16, app. B at 1941 (providing a comprehensive list of 
the canons of statutory interpretation). 
 38. Id. app. B at 1923. 
 39. Id. app. B at 2528. 
 40. Id. app. B at 2934. 
 41. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 11415 (2001) (first alteration in 
original) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (5th ed. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (employing the 
ejusdem generis canon of construction). 
 42. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
 43. The scope of this body of injunctive interpretive principles is so vast, varied, and 
complex that American law schools increasingly offer courses devoted substantially or entirely 
to judicial interpretation of statutes. Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year 
Curriculum, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 166, 168 n.9 (2008); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1904 (2008). 
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prioritize, and coordinate often-discordant injunctive interpretive 
principles.44 
The key difference between injunctive and ordering principles 
lies in the following idea: Injunctive principles instruct courts on the 
methods they should use to interpret statutes and statutory material. 
They are the tools available to courts charged with the task of 
untangling the meaning of statutes. Ordering principles, by 
comparison, define which injunctive principles possess primacy, 
priority, or hierarchic superiority in any given interpretive situation. 
They instruct courts not on how to interpret statutes, but rather on 
which interpretive tools to use or not use in a particular case or 
circumstance. Ordering principles establish that certain injunctive 
interpretive principles trump other injunctive interpretive principles, 
at least in particular situations. In Arlington Central, an ordering 
principle would have determined which injunctive interpretive 
principle—textualist or intentionalist—should have taken precedence 
and governed the Court’s interpretation of IDEA § 1415’s fee-shifting 
provision. This kind of ordering principle is precisely what the law of 
interpretation lacks. Simply stated, no unequivocal ordering rule 
exists to establish a hierarchy between textualist and intentionalist 
injunctive principles. 
Judges, however, do not acknowledge this feature of the law of 
interpretation. Instead, they often proclaim the opposite—that the 
law of interpretation dictates particular orderings of injunctive 
interpretive principles. For example, Justice Scalia argues that the law 
of interpretation grants paramount privilege to statutory text over 
conflicting legislative history.45 In fact, Justice Scalia incorrectly 
describes the law of interpretation. Despite the forceful protestations 
 
 44. Perhaps in response to this phenomenon, some scholars have called for a systematized 
code, a restatement of statutory interpretation, or a stare decisis approach to rules of 
interpretation. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1867 (2008) (supporting the application of stare 
decisis to principles of statutory interpretation); Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of 
Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2004) (arguing for the 
creation of a restatement of statutory-interpretation principles); Rosenkranz, supra note 27, at 
2087 (arguing for a legislatively created code of statutory interpretation). 
 45. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 122 (2007) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“The only sure indication of what Congress intended is what Congress enacted; 
and even if there is a difference between the two, the rule of law demands that the latter 
prevail.”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court has “adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a 
statute” that embraces textualist principles and rejects reliance on legislative history); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 2937 (1997). 
GONZALEZ IN PRINTER PROOF 11/12/2011 3:36:36 PM 
2011] LAW OF INTERPRETATION 597 
found in many of Justice Scalia’s opinions,46 the law of interpretation 
does not definitively require judges to privilege statutory text over 
conflicting legislative intent. To the contrary, the law of interpretation 
manifestly permits courts to go beyond statutory text.47 More 
precisely, the law of interpretation has long sanctioned two conflicting 
injunctive interpretive principles. On the one hand, many cases stand 
for the proposition that when statutory text and legislative intent 
stand in conflict, the text must prevail.48 On the other hand, numerous 
other cases stand for the proposition that legislative intent may trump 
contrary statutory text.49 
Justice Scalia’s preference for text over legislative history as an 
aid in statutory interpretation may or may not be based on sound 
reasoning. My contention, however, is that his preference is entirely 
personal and, therefore, extralegal. When Justice Scalia drafts an 
opinion arguing that the law of interpretation requires courts to 
enforce statutory text regardless of contrary legislative intent, he 
writes not based on what the law of interpretation actually is, but 
rather on what he believes it ought to be. In such situations, he is 
exercising unadulterated judicial discretion based on personal 
preference and conviction rather than legal compulsion.50 
 
 46. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 16, at 989 (listing cases in which Justice Scalia has 
criticized the use of legislative history); see also, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 
50911 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (objecting to the Court’s use of the legislative record to 
corroborate its interpretation that was based on statutory text alone); Koons Buick Pontiac 
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should 
not favor legislative intent over the enacted statutory text). 
 47. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing 
Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 280 
(1990) (stating that the practice of referring to a record of legislative history “can be traced back 
at least a century”); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in 
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 206–13 (1983) (tracing the use of legislative 
history in Supreme Court decisions). 
 48. See infra text accompanying note 63. 
 49. See infra text accompanying note 64. 
 50. Indeed, eight Supreme Court Justices joined an opinion repudiating Justice Scalia’s 
entreaties to avoid using legislative history. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 
61012 n.4 (1991). Moreover, even the Roberts Court, which features several textualist-leaning 
Justices, continues to refer to legislative history regularly when interpreting statutes. See James 
J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme 
Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 22223 (2006) (finding 
that the Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history persists, although it is less frequent than 
during the Burger Court era, and concluding that nearly 50 percent of the decline is attributable 
to Justices Scalia and Thomas). 
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I do not mean to suggest that Justice Scalia acts improperly when 
he exercises this sort of judicial discretion. Legal reform, including 
reform of the law of interpretation, falls squarely within the 
jurisdiction of Supreme Court Justices. My aim is simply to 
underscore the point that Justice Scalia’s rejection of legislative 
history is based not on the extant law of interpretation, but rather on 
his own preferences regarding how the law of interpretation should 
be altered. Because the law of interpretation lacks an ordering 
principle that definitively determines whether text trumps contrary 
intent, or vice versa, the factor that determines whether Justice Scalia 
will consult a legislative record is not internal to the law of 
interpretation. Instead, extralegal considerations, such as Justice 
Scalia’s own personal preferences regarding interpretive 
methodology, will be determinative. 
Although the law of interpretation lacks ordering principles, such 
hierarchy-imposing principles are common in other areas of the law. 
On a macro level, ordering principles dictate that constitutional 
norms trump conflicting statutory norms, which in turn trump 
conflicting administrative norms, which in turn trump conflicting 
common-law norms.51 Similarly, the American federal system includes 
an ordering principle, memorialized in the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, which establishes that federal law trumps conflicting 
state law.52  
Ordering principles commonly operate at the micro level, too. 
Thus, within constitutional law, ordering principles dictate that 
certain constitutional norms must trump other constitutional norms 
when the two conflict. For example, Article I of the Constitution 
grants Congress a broadly interpreted power to pass statutes that 
regulate interstate commerce.53 When an exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power violates the First Amendment’s free-speech, 
assembly, or religious-practice protections, those First Amendment 
protections trump Congress’s Article I legislative powers.54 As 
constitutional norms, both the Commerce Clause and the First 
 
 51. See Carlos E. González, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing Combination of 
Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 80 OR. L. REV. 447, 
533 (2001) (illustrating the hierarchy of legal norms graphically). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 54. See González, supra note 51, at 524 (arguing that under the chronologic axiom, when in 
conflict, rights-granting clauses in the Bill of Rights trump power-granting clauses in the 
Constitution’s main body). 
GONZALEZ IN PRINTER PROOF 11/12/2011 3:36:36 PM 
2011] LAW OF INTERPRETATION 599 
Amendment are norms of the highest rank. Yet an ordering principle 
clearly establishes that, in cases of conflict, the First Amendment 
trumps the Commerce Clause. Ordering principles establish 
hierarchies of norms in the law of civil procedure as well. Under the 
Erie doctrine, an ordering principle dictates that in federal diversity-
jurisdiction litigation, federal procedural rules trump conflicting state 
procedural rules. Thus, when federal courts adjudicate claims based 
on state substantive law, they apply federal, rather than conflicting 
state, procedural law.55 
Ordering principles are useful in areas in which legal norms are 
likely to come into conflict, such as conflicts between constitutional 
rights and powers, between federal and state substantive law, or 
between federal and state rules of civil procedure. In these areas, 
ordering principles prevent chaotic and inconsistent application of 
conflicting legal norms. But for the existence of a clear and 
unquestionable ordering principle granting First Amendment 
protections superiority over Article I legislative powers, in cases of 
conflict, courts would have no legalistic means for definitively 
adjudicating the constitutionality of an act of Congress that impairs 
First Amendment protections. 
For example, suppose Congress were to pass a statute 
prohibiting employers from requiring their employees to work more 
than four hours on days of religious Sabbath. As long as Congress 
made a serious and plausible finding that the prohibition affected 
interstate commerce, such a statute would fall within Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power.56 The statute, however, would stand in 
conflict with the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause 
protections.57 Without an ordering principle to establish a hierarchy 
 
 55. See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (providing that state law applies 
“except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise 
require or provide”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case 
[based on diversity of citizenship] is the law of the state.”). 
 56. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1622 (2005) (reviewing the Commerce Clause 
doctrine and reaffirming that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate activities 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce in the aggregate); United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 11827 (1941) (holding that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate 
employment conditions such as wages and hours when they affect interstate commerce). 
 57. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709–11 (1985) (holding that a state law 
prohibiting employers from requiring employees to work on the Sabbath violated the 
Establishment Clause because it favored or advanced religion over other interests); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971) (holding that state laws providing for the funding of 
secular subjects in religious schools violate the Establishment Clause). 
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between First Amendment protections and any conflicting exercises 
of Article I legislative powers, neither could claim a definitive trump 
over the other. Courts could vacillate in their outcomes. One court 
could find such a statute unconstitutional because it violates a First 
Amendment protection, even though it was passed under a valid 
exercise of the Commerce Clause. This court would be giving First 
Amendment protections priority over Commerce Clause legislative 
power. By contrast, a different court—or even the same court at a 
later date—could find that the statute is valid and constitutional. That 
court would be giving the Commerce Clause power priority over First 
Amendment protections. 
The latter holding seems both strange and mistaken. But the 
reason it seems strange and mistaken is that a universally 
recognizable and unimpeachable ordering principle establishes a 
hierarchy. Every constitutional lawyer would acknowledge that First 
Amendment protections trump conflicting exercises of Commerce 
Clause legislative power. Under this ordering principle, Congress is 
permitted to pass laws that substantially affect interstate commerce, 
as long as those laws do not infringe First Amendment—or other—
constitutional rights and protections. 
A review of litigated issues will reveal the presence or absence of 
ordering principles. In areas in which ordering principles are present, 
litigation will not dwell on ordering issues but instead will focus on 
whether the case presents a conflict of norms. In a case involving the 
Commerce Clause power and the Establishment Clause protection, 
for example, the ordering principle granting the latter primacy over 
the former is entrenched, clear, and understood. Litigants therefore 
will not bother to contest the existence or applicability of that 
ordering principle. Instead, they will argue over whether a conflict is 
present or whether the law, passed under Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers, infringes on Establishment Clause protections. 
Thus, for the statute prohibiting employers from requiring 
employees to work on days of religious Sabbath, the key litigation 
question will be whether such a statute violates the Establishment 
Clause’s prohibition on laws favoring religious interests. If it does—
and yes, it does58—the applicable ordering principle indisputably 
privileges the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause protections 
over Congress’s legislative power under the Commerce Clause. The 
 
 58. Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 71011. 
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presence of an entrenched and unequivocal ordering principle takes 
the issue of whether the Establishment Clause protections trump a 
conflicting exercise of Commerce Clause legislative powers off the 
table, thereby narrowing the litigation to a different issue: whether 
the exercise of Commerce Clause legislative powers in question 
conflicts with the Establishment Clause protections. 
Evidence from litigation supports the claim that the law of 
interpretation lacks ordering principles. Arguments in statutory-
interpretation cases often focus on which injunctive interpretive rule 
holds a paramount status. Thus, in cases in which statutory text and 
legislative intent stand in conflict, the issue of whether text should 
trump intent, or vice versa, is very much front and center.59 In 
Arlington Central, the majority and dissenting opinions were divided 
on this central legal issue.60 If there had been a clearly established 
ordering principle to decide the issue, the opinions would not have 
needed to argue the point. 
B. False Ordering Principles 
The law of interpretation is almost all judge-made law; its 
elements are found in, and are the product of, court opinions.61 The 
courts have not developed any set of positive norms to organize, 
prioritize, or rank the law of interpretation’s vast and varied array of 
injunctive principles. Simply stated, the reporters are full of injunctive 
interpretive principles, but devoid of ordering principles that would 
serve to place the injunctive principles in an identifiable and 
uncontroversial hierarchy. 
Many statements in cases look like, or at least purport to operate 
as, ordering principles establishing the hierarchic superiority of 
certain injunctive interpretive principles over others. Close 
examination, however, shows that these statements do not operate as 
ordering principles and do not establish hierarchies of injunctive 
principles. They instead constitute nothing more than standard 
conflicts and contradictions between injunctive interpretive 
principles. 
 
 59. The lower federal court cases that deal with IDEA § 1415 and the shifting of expert-
witness fees exemplify this phenomenon. See infra text accompanying notes 7299. 
 60. See infra text accompanying notes 95111. 
 61. O’Connor, supra note 44, at 336 (stating that “most of the ‘rules’ of statutory 
interpretation are judge-made”); Rosenkranz, supra note 27, at 2086 (observing that courts have 
developed principles of statutory interpretation). 
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For example, numerous case authorities seem to suggest that text 
trumps conflicting legislative intent. Thus, as mentioned in the 
Introduction,62 many case authorities endorse the proposition that 
“when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—
at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to 
enforce it according to its terms.”63 In isolation, this kind of statement 
might appear to represent an ordering principle that unequivocally 
establishes the primacy of statutory text—at least unambiguous 
statutory text—over conflicting legislative intent. 
Other case authorities, however, undermine any ordering 
function this sort of statement might perform. Many cases 
communicate the notion that when “literal application of a statute 
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters[,] . . . . the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict 
language, controls.”64 This statement, if viewed in isolation, also looks 
 
 62. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 63. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005); see also Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 
526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established that ‘when the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to 
enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters 
Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000))); Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 6 (repeating the same quotation 
from United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis 
begins with ‘the language of the statute.’ And where the statutory language provides a clear 
answer, it ends there as well.” (citation omitted) (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992))); Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 475 (“In a statutory construction 
case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with 
clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary 
circumstance, is finished.”); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is 
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in 
which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it 
according to its terms.”). 
 64. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 
U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 10405 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]n rare cases the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.”); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 
495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The strict language of the Bankruptcy 
Code does not control, even if the statutory language has a ‘plain’ meaning, if the application of 
that language ‘will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.’” 
(quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242)); Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571 (“Nevertheless, in rare 
cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.”); Lionberger v. Rouse, 76 
U.S. (9. Wall.) 468, 475 (1869) (“It is a universal rule in the exposition of statutes that the intent 
of the law, if it can be clearly ascertained, shall prevail over the letter, and this is especially true 
where the precise words, if construed in their ordinary sense, would lead to manifest injustice.”); 
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 48687 (1868) (“General terms should be so 
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as though it establishes an ordering principle, albeit an ordering 
principle that demands the opposite hierarchy from that demanded 
by the prior principle—legislative intent over conflicting statutory 
text. 
The simultaneous existence of case authorities purporting to 
establish both textualism and intentionalism as hierarchically superior 
does not demonstrate that the law of interpretation indeed includes 
some sort of text-versus-intent ordering principle. To the contrary, it 
undermines any claim of superior hierarchic status and demonstrates 
the irreconcilably conflicted nature of the law of interpretation’s 
injunctive principles. In simple terms, one valid and firmly established 
interpretive principle maintains that statutory text trumps conflicting 
legislative intent. Another equally valid and firmly established 
interpretive principle maintains the exact opposite—that legislative 
intent trumps conflicting statutory text. In the end, neither of these 
statements operates as an ordering principle capable of setting a 
definitive or unequivocal hierarchy between textualist and 
intentionalist principles. Both statements are really nothing more 
than iterations of two competing injunctive interpretive principles. 
With no ordering principle to referee the conflict, these contradictory 
assertions of normative supremacy merely cancel each other out.65 
 
limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It 
will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its 
language . . . .”); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (stating that 
“general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to 
those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them”); Eskridge, supra note 16, at 628 
n.25 (stating that “[i]n a significant number of cases, the Court has pretty much admitted that it 
was displacing plain meaning with apparent legislative intent or purpose gleaned from 
legislative history” and citing numerous Supreme Court cases as examples); Manning, supra 
note 27, at 2399 & n.36 (listing several Supreme Court cases “sanctioning departures from clear 
statutory texts when exceptional circumstances disclosed ‘a clearly expressed legislative 
intention to the contrary’” (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U.S. 102, 108 (1980))). 
 65. Nor does the frequency of use of different injunctive principles reveal any sort of 
hierarchy of injunctive principles within the law of interpretation. The more frequent use of 
some injunctive principles could signal that those principles are simply more popular with 
judges. If that is the case, then simply the personal preferences of judges for some injunctive 
interpretive principles over others—and not any true ordering principles within the law of 
interpretation—is at work.  
Greater frequency of use could also signal that courts tend to apply some injunctive 
principles in a predictable sequence, and consequently that they apply the first principle in the 
sequence with greater frequency. For example, it may be that some courts apply textualism as a 
first method and only resort to intentionalist, purposive, or dynamic methods if textualism 
produces an unsatisfactory result. So long as textualism often produces satisfactory results, this 
sequential formula would result in courts’ relying on textualism more than intentionalism or 
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Because the law of interpretation endorses two contrary 
injunctive principles and fails to establish a hierarchy between them, 
nothing within the law of interpretation compels courts to 
consistently apply one injunctive principle over another. As occurred 
in Arlington Central, judges who wish to apply a textualist 
methodology can rely on the case authorities stating that the sole 
function of courts is to apply the plain meaning of statutory text 
regardless of conflicting legislative intent. Likewise, judges who wish 
to apply an intentionalist methodology can rely on the cases favoring 
legislative intent over conflicting statutory text. Neither set of judges 
will be able to cite dispositive case authority that unequivocally and 
without substantial contradiction ranks one interpretive approach 
over the other. In other words, no trump cards that could settle a 
disagreement over injunctive principles between these two sets of 
judges exist within the law of interpretation. 
C. Generating Rather than Resolving Interpretive Choice 
So far, this Article has used Arlington Central and its text-versus-
intent interpretive choice as an exemplar to illustrate two important 
features of the law of interpretation. First, the law of interpretation 
sanctions numerous injunctive interpretive principles that can 
produce divergent statutory interpretations. Second, it lacks any 
ordering principles that could determine which injunctive principle 
should prevail in cases of conflict. 
Because of these two features, the law of interpretation 
generates, rather than resolves, instances of interpretive choice. 
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate this point is to imagine a 
counterfactual law of interpretation that does not exhibit either of 
these two features. Removing either feature would eliminate the 
phenomenon of interpretive choice. First, imagine a law of 
interpretation that contains just one injunctive approach: interpret all 
statutes in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the inscribed and 
approved statutory words. True, even this simplified law of 
interpretation would not provide all of the answers. Given the 
inherent ambiguity of language, courts would still have to determine 
 
dynamism. Nothing in this practice, however, would signal any hierarchic superiority of 
textualism over other competing injunctive principles. Whatever the greater frequency with 
which some injunctive principles are used, that frequency does not provide ordering principles 
that resolve the problem in Arlington Central and discussed in this Article. 
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the ordinary meaning of statutory texts under varying circumstances.66 
But because such a law of interpretation would sanction only one 
general interpretive approach, interpretive choice between general 
interpretive approaches would be nonexistent. No textualism-versus-
intentionalism conflict could arise, as intentionalism would not be 
sanctioned as a valid interpretive method.67 
Second, imagine a law of interpretation that sanctioned 
competing injunctive interpretive principles but that also included a 
set of ordering principles establishing clear hierarchies for cases in 
which the injunctive principles led to conflicting statutory 
interpretations. Here too courts would face no interpretive choices, at 
least not in the sense of courts’ choosing to privilege one injunctive 
principle over another. In every case in which different injunctive 
principles pointed to different statutory interpretations, an ordering 
principle would specify the appropriate hierarchy of principles, thus 
obviating any need for interpretive choice. In cases in which the text 
pointed to one statutory construction and legislative intent to a 
different construction, an established and unimpeachable ordering 
principle would determine which of the two should control. 
The real law of interpretation, however, sanctions competing 
injunctive interpretive principles and lacks ordering principles.68 Cases 
like Arlington Central are the natural result. In Arlington Central, 
textualist principles produced an interpretation of IDEA § 1415 that 
denied prevailing plaintiffs the recovery of expert-witness fees, 
whereas intentionalist principles led to an interpretation that 
permitted the recovery of those fees. Because the law of 
interpretation sanctions both textualist and intentionalist 
methodologies, both constructions count as plausible and legally 
legitimate IDEA § 1415 interpretations. 
This situation left the Court with an interpretive choice: Should 
the Court enforce the statutory text or the contrary legislative intent? 
If the law of interpretation had offered an ordering principle 
establishing a definitive hierarchy between statutory text and 
 
 66. Courts using textualist methods sometimes disagree on the meaning of statutory text. 
See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–27, 139 (1998) (interpreting the word 
“carries” in a sentencing statute in different text-based ways). 
 67. Interpretive choices among different textualist injunctive principles, however, would be 
possible. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–
98, 702–03 (1995) (rejecting the lowers court’s usage of noscitur sociis and instead employing the 
canon against surplusage). 
 68. See supra Part I.A. 
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legislative intent, the case would have been easy. Whichever 
interpretation flowed from the hierarchically superior interpretive 
methodology would have been considered legally correct. But the law 
of interpretation lacks such an ordering principle, and it therefore 
provided no way to determine which interpretive methodology, or 
which statutory interpretation, was legally superior. 
Because the law of interpretation sanctions competing 
methodologies, it generates interpretive choices. By failing to provide 
an ordering principle to mediate conflicts between competing 
interpretive methodologies, the law of interpretation offers no way to 
referee an interpretive choice and identify a single legally superior 
interpretation. Thus, in Arlington Central, neither the majority’s 
textualist-derived interpretation nor the dissent’s intentionalist-
derived interpretation could claim a legally superior status. The two 
competing interpretive approaches—and two competing IDEA 
interpretations—were left in a state of exactly equal hierarchic status 
and legal validity. 
The presence of two equally valid methodologies generates 
uncommon forms of legal ambiguity and judicial discretion not found 
in areas of law in which ordering principles are present. First, 
consider the manner in which the law of interpretation generates this 
form of ambiguity. As I suggest, legal materials themselves may 
exhibit an inherent ambiguity stemming from the imprecision of 
language.69 The law of interpretation, however, can produce 
ambiguity even when the underlying legal materials themselves are 
relatively unambiguous. The reason that the meaning of the IDEA 
§ 1415 fee-shifting provision was in doubt in Arlington Central had 
nothing to do with the IDEA itself. Both its text and its legislative 
history were relatively unambiguous.70 Instead, the meaning of the 
IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting provision was ambiguous because (1) the 
law of interpretation sanctions competing interpretive methodologies, 
but (2) it offers no legal formula for determining which interpretive 
methodology, and which consequent interpretation, should prevail. In 
other words, the law of interpretation transformed unambiguous 
statutory materials into an ambiguous statute.71 
 
 69. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32. 
 71. Compare the ambiguity of the IDEA in Arlington Central with my hypothetical statute 
regarding work on the Sabbath. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. In cases involving a 
conflict between the Commerce Clause and a First Amendment protection, an unimpeachable 
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As a matter of course, courts often must exercise discretion in 
interpreting and applying inherently ambiguous legal materials. The 
law of interpretation’s lack of ordering principles, however, offers 
courts discretion on a completely separate plane. Because it lacks 
ordering principles, the law of interpretation affords courts the legally 
unconstrained discretion to choose between conflicting interpretive 
principles. Thus, in Arlington Central, should the Court have 
employed textualist or intentionalist injunctive interpretive 
principles? Because the law of interpretation does not include an 
ordering principle that definitively settles this question, the Court 
exercised legally unconstrained discretion in deciding whether text 
trumped conflicting intent, or vice versa.72 
II.  THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO INTERPRETIVE CHOICE: THE 
AVOIDANCE MANEUVER 
In written opinions, judges rarely acknowledge that the law of 
interpretation fails to provide definitive answers in cases of 
interpretive choice or that factors beyond the law of interpretation 
are determinative. Instead, judges respond to interpretive choice by 
deploying an avoidance maneuver. The avoidance maneuver comes in 
two archetypal variants. 
In one archetypal variant, judges will acknowledge that different 
injunctive interpretive principles point to different interpretations, 
but they will simultaneously deny the existence of an interpretive 
choice. Judges will effect this denial by expressly claiming, or 
implicitly suggesting, that the law of interpretation favors certain 
injunctive interpretive principles over others and, therefore, that it 
favors certain statutory interpretations over others. Thus, for the 
 
ordering principle dictates that the latter trumps the former. Any ambiguity in the case would 
stem from uncertainty about the contours of the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment. 
The question would not be, “Does the Commerce Clause trump the First Amendment, or vice 
versa?” An ordering principle unequivocally answers this question. Instead, the question would 
be, “Does the First Amendment offer protection against laws prohibiting private employers 
from requiring work on the Sabbath?” In Arlington Central, the ambiguity stemmed from the 
law of interpretation’s lack of an ordering principle. Should statutory text trump legislative 
intent, or vice versa? The law of interpretation left the outcome uncertain. 
 72. Other areas of law furnish ordering principles and, therefore, limit judicial discretion to 
a single plane. Thus, courts have no discretion to determine whether First Amendment 
protections or Commerce Clause legislative powers are superior. Because an ordering principle 
exists, courts have discretion only on a single plane: defining the meanings and scopes of the 
First Amendment and Commerce Clause or, in other words, determining whether an exercise of 
the Commerce Clause power stands in conflict with any First Amendment rights. 
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textualism-versus-intentionalism interpretive choice presented by 
IDEA § 1415 in Arlington Central, a judge might recognize and even 
discuss both interpretive methodologies, but he will contend that he 
has no discretion to choose between the differing methodologies 
because the law of interpretation ultimately favors one methodology 
over the other.73 
In the second archetypal variant, judges will simply fail to 
grapple with the competing injunctive interpretive principles. Instead, 
judges will simply select an interpretive principle and apply it with 
little or no explanation as to why certain competing interpretive 
principles were subordinated. In the context of the textualism-versus-
intentionalism interpretive choice presented by IDEA § 1415, for 
example, Justice Breyer simply applied intentionalism over 
textualism, but he offered no discussion or explanation as to why 
legislative intent should trump contrary statutory text.74 
Both avoidance maneuver variants are problematic because 
(1) they misrepresent the law of interpretation and (2) they suppress 
public discussion of decisive extralegal factors. Section A uses 
Arlington Central and several lower federal court opinions dealing 
with expert-witness fee shifting to illustrate the avoidance maneuver 
in action. Section B examines what might motivate courts to resort to 
the avoidance maneuver in cases of interpretive choice. 
A. The Avoidance Maneuver in Arlington Central and Other IDEA 
§ 1415 Cases 
Thus far, this Article has used Arlington Central as the exemplar 
case of interpretive choice. Numerous lower federal courts, however, 
have issued opinions on expert-witness fee shifting under IDEA 
§ 1415.75 The lower court opinions employed the two variants of the 
avoidance maneuver. Some opinions expressly or implicitly suggested 
that the law of interpretation favors text over intent, or vice versa.76 
 
 73. See infra text accompanying notes 95–114. 
 74. See infra text accompanying notes 115–26. 
 75. Before the Supreme Court’s June 2006 decision in Arlington Central, forty-six cases 
available in the Westlaw database considered whether prevailing parties may recover expert-
witness fees under IDEA § 1415. The circuit courts had decided six cases on the issue, and the 
district courts had decided forty, twenty-two of which were published in reporters and eighteen 
of which were unpublished but available in the Westlaw database. For a list of these cases, see 
infra Appendix. 
 76. Four of the six circuit court cases explicitly discussed whether statutory text or 
legislative intent should prevail. See Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 73–82 (D.C. 
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Others simply mentioned either textualist themes or intentionalist 
themes but failed to grapple with any conflicting interpretive 
methods.77 Importantly, none of the opinions argued or suggested that 
the law of interpretation could not resolve the choice between 
statutory text and legislative intent. Nor did any of the opinions 
suggest that legally unconstrained judicial discretion or extralegal 
factors were central in deciding whether text or intent should control. 
At one extreme of the first variant of the avoidance maneuver, 
some of the opinions argued pointedly and explicitly that the law of 
interpretation grants one interpretive principle a trump card over 
another and that a legally superior statutory interpretation is 
therefore obvious. For example, in Goldring v. District of Columbia,78 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
asserted that the law of interpretation does not permit any reference 
to legislative history when statutory text is unambiguous. Citing a 
frequently employed injunctive interpretive principle, the Goldring 
majority declared that “there should be no resort to legislative history 
when language is plain and does not lead to an absurd result.”79 The 
court bolstered this declaration with a citation to a string of similar 
supporting principles.80 Because the Goldring majority posited that 
the law of interpretation favors statutory text over contrary legislative 
 
Cir. 2005) (rejecting reliance on legislative history when interpreting IDEA § 1415); Murphy v. 
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 335–40 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 548 U.S. 
291 (2006) (noting that although other courts had relied on the text of IDEA § 1415 alone, the 
legislative history should be relevant to an interpretation of the statute); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. 
Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 481–82 (7th Cir. 2003) (examining the legislative history of IDEA 
§ 1415 but ultimately relying on the statutory text alone to reach a decision); Neosho R-V Sch. 
Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that because the text of IDEA 
§ 1415 is not ambiguous, there was no need to look to its legislative history). Two circuit court 
cases did not discuss the text-versus-intent issue. In Arons v. New Jersey State Board of 
Education, 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit determined that fees charged by a lay 
advocate are not recoverable, but the court noted in dicta and without analysis that fees for 
anything qualifying as expert-witness work could be recovered. Id. at 62–63. Though Arons 
offered no analysis of expert-witness fee shifting under IDEA § 1415, later courts cited Arons 
for the proposition that the Third Circuit had interpreted the IDEA to permit expert-witness 
fee shifting. E.g., Murphy, 402 F.3d at 334; P.G. v. Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251, 
267 (D.N.J. 2000). In Missouri Department of Elementary & Secondary Education v. Springfield 
R-12 School District, 358 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2004), the Eighth Circuit offered no analysis of the 
text-versus-intent issue and merely cited circuit precedent establishing that expert-witness fees 
are not recoverable. Id. at 1002. 
 77. See infra text accompanying notes 115–26. 
 78. Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 79. Id. at 75. 
 80. Id. at 74–75. 
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intent, it concluded that the “correct decision” was “not . . . difficult 
to reach.”81 As portrayed by the Goldring majority, the law of 
interpretation grants clear statutory text a trump card over clear 
contrary evidence of legislative intent. Therefore, per the court’s 
logic, the court did not face an interpretive choice and did not 
exercise legally unconstrained judicial discretion. The law of 
interpretation pointed to a single legally superior construction of the 
IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting provision, and any contrary construction 
was legally inferior. 
The dissenting opinion in Goldring also featured a pointed and 
explicit treatment of the text-versus-intent dilemma. Somewhat 
ironically, however, it argued that the law of interpretation holds that 
even clear statutory text can be trumped by contrary legislative 
intent.82 Like the majority opinion, the Goldring dissent explicitly 
enunciated injunctive interpretive principles. The dissent cited the 
Supreme Court for the injunctive interpretive principles that “the 
ultimate purpose of statutory construction is to effectuate 
congressional intent”83 and that “the strong presumption that the 
plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent [can be] 
rebutted . . . when a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed.”84 
Like the Goldring majority opinion, the dissent offered supporting 
citations to related injunctive interpretive principles, all of which 
bolstered the notion that the law of interpretation favors clearly 
expressed legislative intent over contrary statutory text.85 Thus, both 
the majority and dissenting opinions in Goldring argued that the case 
did not present an interpretive choice because the law of 
interpretation decidedly favored one set of interpretive principles 
over another and, therefore, decidedly favored one IDEA § 1415 
interpretation over another. 
The majority opinion in Neosho R-V School District v. Clark,86 a 
case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, provides 
another example of the first variant of the avoidance maneuver.87 
Like the Goldring majority opinion, the Neosho majority opinion 
 
 81. Id. at 73. 
 82. Id. at 80 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 87. Id. at 1032–33. 
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explicitly argued that the law of interpretation requires courts to 
follow clear statutory text over contrary legislative intent. In the 
words of the Eighth Circuit, “[T]he mere fact that statutory provisions 
conflict with language in the legislative history is not an exceptional 
circumstance permitting a court to apply the legislative history rather 
than the statute.”88 The Neosho majority bolstered this interpretive 
principle with citations to cases enunciating analogous injunctive 
interpretive principles.89 Because the Neosho majority opinion cast 
the law of interpretation as granting clear statutory text a trump over 
clear, but contrary, legislative intent, it implicitly denied the presence 
of any interpretive choice. 
Other opinions exemplifying the first variant of the avoidance 
maneuver were less explicit and pointed in citations to injunctive 
interpretive principles. Still, these opinions strongly implied that 
courts do not face interpretive choices or exercise legally unfettered 
discretion because the law of interpretation grants a trump to either 
unambiguous statutory text or conflicting unambiguous legislative 
intent. The dissenting opinion in Neosho fits this model, as does the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Murphy v. Arlington Central,90 the case 
that was appealed to the Supreme Court in Arlington Central. 
Unlike the dissent in Goldring, the Neosho dissent did not 
explicitly cite injunctive interpretive principles prioritizing clear 
legislative intent over clear statutory text. It would have been easy to 
offer explicit citations. Eighth Circuit cases have long recognized the 
principle that clear legislative intent may trump contrary statutory 
text.91 Indeed, earlier in the same year that it decided Neosho, the 
 
 88. Id. at 1033 (quoting United States v. Erickson P’ship, 856 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. at 1032–33. 
 90. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 
548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
 91. See, e.g., In re Waugh, 109 F.3d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the intent of 
Congress must trump the literal meaning of the statutory text at issue and citing Ron Pair 
Enterprises, Inc., for the proposition that “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be 
conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989))); Mo. Dep’t of Revenue v. L.J. 
O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing the same proposition from Ron Pair 
Enterprises); Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198, 1202 (8th Cir. 1976) (“[A] statute will not be 
read literally if such a reading leads to a result that conflicts with Congress’ intent.”); 
Derengowski v. United States, 404 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1968) (“The maxim of strict 
construction may not be utilized to defeat the clear intent of a statute, nor to encompass within 
its meaning something obviously omitted from its terms.”). 
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Eighth Circuit explicitly recognized that a court may apply legislative 
intent over contrary statutory text when “the literal application of a 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions 
of its drafters.”92 Though it omitted a citation to that particular case, 
the Neosho dissent was built on this principle. The Neosho dissent 
explained that “Congress’s clear legislative intent, [as well as] the 
nature and purpose of the IDEA[,] compels an award of expert 
witness fees as part of the costs.”93 In stressing that the superiority of 
legislative intent and statutory purpose “compel[led]” a certain 
interpretation of IDEA § 1415, the Neosho dissent implied that the 
law of interpretation requires courts to apply clearly expressed 
legislative intent over contrary statutory text. 
The Second Circuit’s IDEA decision, Murphy v. Arlington 
Central,94 in many ways paralleled the formula used by the Neosho 
dissent. Like the Neosho dissent, the Murphy decision failed to cite 
any cases for the proposition that clear intent should trump clear text. 
It nonetheless strongly implied that these principles compelled or 
required the court to favor intent over text. The closest the Murphy 
court came to avowing an explicit injunctive interpretive rule was 
with the following language: “While we appreciate—and in practice 
honor, wherever possible—the virtues of relying solely on statutory 
text, at times text without context can lead to results that Congress 
did not intend.”95 This statement makes sense only if the Second 
Circuit implicitly relied on an injunctive interpretive principle 
granting clearly expressed legislative intent a trump over 
unambiguous statutory text. Just as in the Neosho dissent, the court 
had circuit precedent that it could have relied on for the principle that 
clear intent will be determinative, even when it is contrary to the clear 
text of a statute.96 
 
 92. In re Kolich, 328 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In In re Kolich, 328 
F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that other courts, in interpreting a 
particular section of the Bankruptcy Code, had refused to “apply the [statutory-text] formula 
literally” because literal application “would [have] produce[d] an outcome at odds with the 
purpose of Congress.” Id. (citing Nelson v. Scala, 192 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, 
the Eighth Circuit found that literal application of the statutory clause in question would not 
conflict with legislative intent. Id. at 410. 
 93. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d at 1035 (Pratt, J., dissenting). 
 94. Murphy, 402 F.3d at 335–40. 
 95. Id. at 336. 
 96. Before the 2005 Murphy opinion, the Second Circuit had decided two cases in which it 
endorsed an intent-over-text principle. See Tyler v. Douglas, 280 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Although a statute’s plain language is generally dispositive, it sometimes will yield when 
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Also paralleling the Neosho dissent was the Murphy court’s 
argument that legislative intent, along with two other factors,97 
“require[d it] to find that Congress intended to and did authorize the 
reimbursement of expert fees in IDEA actions.”98 A bit later in the 
opinion, the Second Circuit reiterated that legislative intent required 
the court to construe the IDEA as permitting recovery of expert-
witness fees.99 By stressing that the IDEA interpretation was 
required, the Murphy decision strongly implied that the law of 
interpretation privileges clear legislative intent over clear statutory 
text, at least in the narrow circumstances presented by the case. 
Neither the Murphy decision nor the Neosho dissent suggested that 
judicial discretion or extralegal factors compelled an IDEA 
interpretation privileging legislative intent over statutory text. To the 
contrary, both implied that the law of interpretation compels and 
requires a particular IDEA construction. 
Like the various Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy opinions, the 
Court’s majority and dissent in Arlington Central deployed the first 
variant of the avoidance maneuver. Both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Arlington Central acknowledged that the law of 
interpretation sanctions injunctive interpretive rules that could 
support more than one IDEA interpretation. Ultimately, however, 
both opinions argued or implied that the law of interpretation 
identifies both a legally superior interpretive approach and a legally 
superior interpretation of IDEA § 1415. In other words, both 
 
evidence of legislative history is so strong to the contrary that giving a literal reading to the 
statutory language will result in defeating Congress’ purpose in enacting it.” (quoting Greene v. 
United States, 79 F.3d 1348, 1356 (2d Cir. 1996))); United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82, 89 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (“A statute should not be literally applied if it results in an interpretation clearly at 
odds with the intent of the drafters.”). After the Murphy opinion, Second Circuit cases 
continued to recognize the intent-over-text principle. See United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150, 
156 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We acknowledge that where the literal meaning of a statute yields an 
illogical result or one manifestly not intended by the legislature, departure from strict adherence 
to statutory text may be warranted.”); Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the 
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 
its drafters.” (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 97. First, the Murphy court believed that dicta in the Supreme Court case of West Virginia 
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), was consistent with its analysis of IDEA 
§ 1415’s legislative history. Murphy, 402 F.3d at 336–37. Second, the Murphy court believed that 
congressional inaction following the Casey decision suggested that the Casey dicta had been 
correct. Id. at 337. 
 98. Id. at 336. 
 99. Id. at 337. 
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Arlington Central opinions ultimately argued that the law of 
interpretation obviates any interpretive choice between textualism 
and intentionalism, and that it thereby denies any meaningful role for 
legally unconstrained judicial discretion. 
In casting the law of interpretation as establishing that statutory 
text trumps contrary legislative intent, the Arlington Central majority 
invoked a variant of the familiar injunctive interpretive principle used 
in the Goldring and Neosho majority opinions. The Arlington Central 
majority stated that “[w]hen the statutory ‘language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the 
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’”100 The 
majority opinion then outlined the reasons it found the text of the 
IDEA to be unambiguous.101 For the majority, “the terms of the 
IDEA overwhelmingly support[ed] the conclusion that prevailing 
parents may not recover the costs of experts or consultants.”102 
The Arlington Central majority conceded that the legislative 
record was contrary to its text-centered reading of the IDEA and 
admitted that legislative history might deserve “merit in another 
context.”103 Ultimately, however, the majority opinion concluded that 
“where everything other than the legislative history overwhelmingly 
suggests that expert fees may not be recovered, the legislative history 
is simply not enough.”104 As the Arlington Central majority cast it, the 
law of interpretation permits intentionalist interpretive methods and 
consultation of legislative history in some circumstances. When 
statutory text is unambiguous, however, the law of interpretation 
grants statutory text a trump over evidence of contrary legislative 
intent and, therefore, produces the IDEA interpretation advanced by 
 
 100. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006). 
 101. The majority found that the text of the IDEA provision on cost shifting—as well as 
other statutory provisions that define “costs” and previous cases defining “costs” in other 
contexts—supported this construction of the IDEA. Id. at 296–98, 300–03. In addition, the 
majority argued that under the clear-statement rule of Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), because the IDEA was passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending 
Clause power, the IDEA could not be read as providing states with clear notice that they would 
have to pay prevailing parties’ expert-witness fees in IDEA cases. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 
295–96. In other words, the Pennhurst principle provides an additional reason to favor statutory 
text over contrary legislative intent that might not be present in statutes that are not passed 
pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause powers. 
 102. Id. at 300. 
 103. Id. at 304. 
 104. Id. 
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the majority.105 Thus, according to the Arlington Central majority, no 
interpretive choice existed between text and intent: the law of 
interpretation, not legally unconstrained judicial discretion, furnished 
the grounds for saying that statutory text trumped contrary legislative 
intent. 
For its part, the Arlington Central dissent similarly cast the law of 
interpretation—and not judicial discretion or extralegal factors—as 
the arbiter between competing text- and intent-derived 
interpretations of the IDEA. According to the dissent, however, the 
law of interpretation favors legislative intent over statutory text. The 
dissent offered an exhaustive recounting of the legislative history 
establishing that Congress understood that the IDEA would permit 
prevailing claimants to recover expert-witness fees as part of their 
costs. The centerpiece of this evidence of legislative intent was the 
House-Senate conference committee’s report on the IDEA. The 
conference committee’s report stated that “[t]he conferees intend[ed] 
that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of costs’ [would] include 
reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses.”106 In addition, the 
dissent described several other aspects of the record of legislative 
history that demonstrated Congress’s understanding and intent 
throughout the legislative process for prevailing claimants to recover 
expert-witness fees as part of their costs.107 Ultimately, the dissent 
 
 105. The majority also held that when the Court is interpreting legislation passed pursuant 
to the Spending Clause, it has additional reason to prefer clear text over contrary legislative 
intent. Specifically, Justice Alito noted that the majority “[could ]not say that the legislative 
history on which [the] respondents [were] rely[ing was] sufficient to provide the requisite fair 
notice” of the cost to states. Id. 
 106. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). 
 107. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 309–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In essence, the dissent 
argued that the record of legislative history suggested that the House, the Senate, and the 
conference committee had all intended to permit the shifting of expert-witness fees, but that the 
conference had adopted clumsy language that failed to express that intent unequivocally. On the 
Senate side, a bipartisan compromise produced language that would have allowed courts to 
award “a reasonable attorney’s fee in addition to the costs to a parent” who prevailed in an 
IDEA action. S. REP. NO. 99-112, pt. 2, at 15 (1985). On the floor of the Senate, Senator Lowell 
Weicker, Jr., explained that this language reflected the legislature’s “intent that such awards 
[would] include, at the discretion of the court, reasonable attorney’s fees, [and] necessary expert 
witness fees.” 131 CONG. REC. 21,390 (1985) (statement of Sen. Lowell Weicker, Jr.). The 
Arlington Central dissent argued that “[t]he House version of the bill also reflected an intention 
to authorize recovery of expert costs.” Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
The House Committee on Education and Labor reported a version of the bill that would have 
permitted courts to “award reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-
296, at 1, 5 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). The House report stated the following: 
“The phrase ‘expenses and costs’ includes expenses of expert witnesses.” Id. at 6. The 
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concluded, “Members of both Houses of Congress voted to adopt 
both the statutory text [of the IDEA] and the Conference Report that 
made clear that the statute’s words include[d] the expert costs here in 
question.”108 
The dissent also addressed the text of the IDEA, admitting that 
the majority’s interpretation represented the most “linguistically 
natural” reading of the text.109 But the dissent argued that such an 
understanding of the text was “not inevitable.”110 To the dissent, “the 
word ‘costs’ alone, sa[id] nothing at all about which costs f[e]ll within 
its scope” and the text of the IDEA did not “unambiguously foreclose 
an award of expert fees.”111 Moreover, the dissent argued that “one 
can, consistent with the language,” read the IDEA as permitting 
recovery of expert-witness fees by prevailing IDEA claimants.112 In 
short, the Arlington Central dissent did not base its IDEA 
interpretation on the most natural meaning of the text, but instead on 
a merely plausible textual construction that could be made 
compatible with the contours of the unambiguously expressed 
legislative intent.113 
In much the same style employed in the Neosho dissent and the 
Murphy opinion,114 the Arlington Central dissent did not bother to 
offer an explicit citation to cases enunciating injunctive interpretive 
principles. Nonetheless, the structure of the argument in the 
Arlington Central dissent plainly relied on a particular injunctive 
interpretive principle. To simplify, the dissent (1) established clear 
evidence of the legislature’s intent that expert-witness fees should be 
 
conference committee reconciled the difference in the Senate and House versions of the cost-
shifting provision by adopting an amendment providing that “the court, in its discretion, may 
award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The conference committee’s report explained that the conferees 
intended for “the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ [to] include reasonable expenses and 
fees of expert witnesses.” Id. 
 108. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 313 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also bolstered 
his evidence of legislative intent with the argument that adoption of the interpretation advanced 
by the majority would undermine the basic purpose of the IDEA. Id. at 313–16. 
 109. Id. at 319. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Arguably, the dissent engaged in what Dean Roscoe Pound termed “spurious 
interpretation.” See Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 382 (1907) 
(“[T]he object of spurious interpretation is to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely 
discover [the meaning of statutory text].”). 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 91–94. 
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recoverable under IDEA § 1415; (2) argued that the text of IDEA 
§ 1415 was susceptible to a construction permitting recovery of 
expert-witness fees; and (3) concluded that the Court should adopt 
the interpretation matching the clearly expressed legislative intent, 
rather that the most linguistically natural interpretation. The dissent 
did not pursue this structure to suggest that the Court is free to 
engage in a legally unconstrained exercise of judicial discretion, giving 
IDEA § 1415 whatever meaning it might prefer.115 To the contrary, 
the dissent adopted this strategy because it implicitly relied on the 
principle that courts should seek to interpret statutes in accordance 
with the clear intent of Congress, as long as the statutory text is 
susceptible to a meaning consistent with that clear intent. The 
pedigree of this interpretive principle is well known and firmly 
established.116 
The dissent’s choice of this interpretive principle is interesting. 
The Arlington Central majority opinion, as well as the various 
Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy opinions, all acknowledged that the 
statutory text and the legislative intent stood in irreconcilable conflict. 
They then argued or implied that the law of interpretation negated 
any interpretive choice by granting unambiguous text a trump over 
unambiguous intent, or vice versa. Justice Breyer’s Arlington Central 
 
 115. The dissent stated that it could “find no good reason . . . to interpret the language of 
[the] statute as meaning the precise opposite of what Congress told us it intended.” Arlington 
Cent., 548 U.S. at 309 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This statement suggests that the dissent 
understood that the law of interpretation does not require courts to apply the most linguistically 
natural reading of a statutory text over contrary legislative intent. 
 116. See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971) (“If an absolutely literal 
reading of a statutory provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose, a 
less literal construction must be considered.”); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 
706–07 & n.9 (2000) (adopting an interpretation that departed from the most natural or 
ordinary meaning of the statutory text, in part because the ordinary meaning would have 
contravened “clear congressional policy”); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 125 (2001) (“In construing 
a statute, the uncommon sense of a term may be relied on . . . when the realization of clear 
congressional policy is in tension with the result that customary interpretive rules would deliver. 
Where it is evident that some other meaning was intended, and the application of the commonly 
accepted meaning would operate to defeat the purpose of the statute and the intent of the 
legislature, a departure from the usual or natural meaning of the words in a statute may be 
deemed proper. Indeed, it is an old and well-established maxim that words ought to be more 
subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Moreover, it is a general rule that the 
manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words.”); 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:7 (7th ed. 2007) (“Although many expressions favoring literal 
interpretation may be found in caselaw, it is clear that if the literal import of the text of an act is 
inconsistent with the legislative meaning or intent . . . the words of the statute will be construed 
to agree with the intention of the legislature.”). 
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dissent, in contrast, argued that the text and intent could be made 
compatible, and that the law of interpretation requires courts to 
adopt the reading most compatible with clearly expressed legislative 
intent, even if that reading is at odds with the most natural textual 
construction. Thus, the Arlington Central dissent relied on a narrower 
principle than some of the lower court opinions that favored 
legislative intent over contrary statutory text. Some of those opinions 
went as far as to state or imply that clearly expressed legislative intent 
trumps contrary statutory text.117 Justice Breyer’s Arlington Central 
dissent argued only that clearly expressed legislative intent should 
trump the most natural reading of statutory text—provided that the 
text can be given a construction compatible with legislative intent. As 
the Arlington Central dissent understood it, the law of interpretation 
directs courts to bend statutory text to conform to clearly expressed 
legislative intent, rather than to honor the most natural reading of 
statutory text in the face of contrary legislative intent.118 
Though Justice Breyer’s approach was subtly different from that 
of the lower courts, it had the same effect.119 As with the other 
opinions, the Arlington Central dissent implied that the law of 
interpretation dissolves any possible interpretive choice. The dissent’s 
suggestion was not that the law of interpretation grants the Court 
unfettered discretion to choose between text and contrary legislative 
intent. Rather, the suggestion was more subtle: that the law of 
interpretation favors clearly expressed legislative intent over the most 
linguistically natural meaning of statutory text. 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington Central, as 
well as the various Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy opinions, 
demonstrate the first variant of the avoidance maneuver. Numerous 
examples of the second variant of the avoidance maneuver can also 
 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 76–79, 84–94. 
 118. In other words, as the dissent understood the law of interpretation, unambiguous 
evidence of legislative intent trumps the most natural reading of a statutory text, at least when 
the text will permit a meaning consistent with the legislative intent. 
 119. This approach strongly suggests that the dissent understood the law of interpretation in 
a different fashion from the Arlington Central majority and the panels of circuit judges in 
Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy. Those judges framed the central question as whether the law of 
interpretation grants clear text a trump over clear legislative intent, or vice versa. The Arlington 
Central dissent, by contrast, implied that it understood the law of interpretation as obligating 
courts to ask a preliminary question: Can statutory text be made consistent with the clearly 
expressed legislative intent? Only if the answer to this question were “no” would it become 
necessary to decide whether the law of interpretation grants clear text a trump over clear and 
irreconcilably conflicting legislative intent. 
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be found among the lower federal court cases on the shifting of 
expert-witness fees under the IDEA. These opinions did not grapple 
with the issue of whether the law of interpretation favors text or 
contrary legislative intent. Instead, they simply applied either 
textualist or intentionalist principles with little or no analysis, and 
they adopted the consequent IDEA § 1415 construction. As might be 
expected, these cases were often found at the district court level, 
where docket loads may not always permit expansive analysis in 
written opinions.120 
For example, in Field v. Haddonfield Board of Education,121 the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey allowed recovery of 
expert-witness fees under IDEA § 1415.122 The opinion merely cited 
the conference committee’s report on the issue; it offered no 
discussion of why that report should prevail over the text of IDEA 
§ 1415.123 Similarly, in Aranow v. District of Columbia,124 the District 
Court for the District of Columbia permitted recovery of expert-
witness fees and stated nothing more than the following: “Based upon 
a review of the legislative history of . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), the Court 
is convinced that the award of fees for the services of an expert 
witness is not barred under the Supreme Court’s analysis in West 
Virginia [University] Hospitals, Inc. [v. Casey125] . . . and is consistent 
with Congress’ purpose in enacting [§ 1415(e)].”126 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Connecticut was even more succinct in Mr. & 
Mrs. B. v. Weston Board of Education.127 In that case, the Court cited 
the conference committee’s report and a decision from another 
federal district court and, without explanation, concluded that “the 
 
 120. Not all of the federal district court cases on expert-witness fee shifting under the IDEA 
are characterized by superficial analysis. See, e.g., Brillon ex rel. Brillon v. Klein Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d 864, 870–72 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (discussing § 1415’s text, legislative history, 
statutory purpose, and interpretation in other courts), rev’d in part, 100 Fed. App’x 309 (5th Cir. 
2004); Pazik v. Gateway Reg’l Sch. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220–21 (D. Mass. 2001) (analyzing 
the text, legislative intent, and statutory purpose of § 1415 before discussing the Supreme 
Court’s and First Circuit’s uses of legislative history). 
 121. Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 1313 (D.N.J. 1991). 
 122. Id. at 1323. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Aranow v. District of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 125. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
 126. Aranow, 791 F. Supp. at 318. This sparse treatment is particularly troubling because the 
district court’s opinion reconsidered and altered its previous decision to deny recovery of 
expert-witness fees in the same case based on the text of IDEA § 1415. Compare id., with 
Aranow v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 127. Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F. Supp. 2d 777 (D. Conn. 1999). 
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view that expert witness fees are recoverable under the IDEA as part 
of attorney’s fees and costs [was] the better one.”128 
Cases offering little or no analysis of whether the law of 
interpretation favors clear text or clear contrary legislative intent are 
not limited to opinions permitting recovery of expert-witness fees 
under IDEA § 1415. For example, in Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified 
School District,129 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California denied recovery of expert-witness fees and stated little 
more than that “the IDEA has no provision for them” and that it was 
“reluctant” to award them “without any clear authority from 
Congress.”130 In Mayo v. Booker,131 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maryland was even more fleeting in denying recovery of 
expert-witness fees under IDEA § 1415.132 The court merely stated 
that, in its view, “expert witness fees [were] not recoverable under the 
IDEA, which provides only for shifting of ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees 
as part of the costs.’”133 
B. Why Deploy the Avoidance Maneuver? 
Federal courts’ treatment of expert-witness fee shifting under 
IDEA § 1415 illustrates the avoidance maneuver in the context of a 
conflict between unambiguous statutory text and unambiguous 
contrary legislative intent. Though the law of interpretation does not 
include an ordering principle to resolve this conflict, none of the 
federal courts interpreting IDEA § 1415 openly confronted this 
reality. Instead, they deployed some variation of the avoidance 
maneuver. 
Why do courts deploy the avoidance maneuver? Why do they 
deny the presence of interpretive choice? Why do they deny the roles 
of legally unconstrained judicial discretion and extralegal factors in 
resolving interpretive choices? Rule-of-law values prompt courts to 
portray the law of interpretation as doing more work than it is 
actually capable of doing in resolving interpretive choices. At bottom, 
rule-of-law values maintain that established legal principles, rather 
 
 128. Id. at 784. 
 129. Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., No. S-03-2568 WBS KJM, 2004 WL 4999156 
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004). 
 130. Id. at *3–4. 
 131. Mayo v. Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 1999). 
 132. See id. at 599. 
 133. Id. 
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than legally unconstrained discretion, should govern.134 Applied to 
courts, rule-of-law values dictate that judges should both arrive at and 
justify their decisions through legal norms, not by reference to 
extralegal factors such as policy considerations or personal 
preferences.135 Applied to cases presenting interpretive choices, rule-
 
 134. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the 
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”); 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (defining the rule of law as requiring 
“that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive 
powers in given circumstances”); POSNER, supra note 34, at 89 (“[O]ne meaning of the term 
‘rule of law’ . . . . is ‘a government of laws not men’—that is, that law is the ruler of the nation 
rather than officials being the rulers.”). 
 135. Extralegal policy considerations and the personal preferences of judges probably do 
affect judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 9, 81 (acknowledging that 
extralegal factors such as judges’ “own political opinions or policy judgments” play a role in 
judicial decisionmaking and referring to judges as “occasional legislators”); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123–26 (1995) (analyzing how judicial behavior can be affected by 
extralegal factors and personal preferences); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86–96 (2002) (discussing the 
attitudinal model, which posits that the political ideologies of judges may drive their judicial 
decisions); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6, 94 (2005) (concluding that canons of construction 
“are regularly used in an instrumental if not ideologically conscious manner” and that the use of 
canons “is fundamentally a façade to justify certain judicially devised policy preferences”); 
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–79 (1997) (discussing the attitudinal 
model, which “suggests that judicial decisionmaking is not based upon reasoned judgment from 
precedent, but rather upon each judge’s political ideology and the identity of the parties”); 
Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics 
Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 244–45 (2009) (discussing the 
attitudinal model, which “posits that judges decide cases based on their political attitudes and 
values”). 
As a justification for judicial decisions, however, extralegal factors are almost never 
considered sufficient. Courts are expected to offer justifications for their decisions that are 
rooted in the application of legal principles, rather than extralegal factors. See Robert J. 
Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of 
Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1993) (“The purpose of the opinion is, 
rather, to show that the decision is not arbitrary but can be supported rationally and is not 
inconsistent with prior decisions of the court or, in the case of a statute, with the text of the 
statute.”); Thomas W. Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 137, 137 (1994) (“The legitimacy of the Supreme Court is widely assumed to depend on 
the perception that its decisions are dictated by law.”); Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 155–56 (1994) (“Presumably, courts could tell the loser: ‘You 
have lost because we, the judges, have chosen that you should lose. We have so chosen because 
we think society would be better off if you lost.’ Courts have decided, however, in all of the 
societies that have a modern judicial system, to avoid the appearance of deciding cases based on 
judicial whim. . . . [I]n all modern societies, and in all cases, judges tell the loser: ‘You did not 
lose because we the judges chose that you should lose. You lost because the law required that 
you should lose.’”). 
GONZALEZ IN PRINTER PROOF 11/12/2011 3:36:36 PM 
622 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:583 
of-law values admonish courts against contending that extralegal 
considerations determine which interpretive principles, and which 
interpretations, will prevail.136 To the contrary, rule-of-law values 
demand that courts cast their chosen interpretive principles and 
consequent statutory interpretations as compelled by the law of 
interpretation.137 A legal opinion that is consistent with rule-of-law 
values seeks to explain why the law of interpretation requires certain 
injunctive interpretive principles to control and why it generates one 
legally superior statutory construction. 
Courts have strong instrumental reasons to adhere to rule-of-law 
values. All other things being equal, a judicial opinion adhering to 
rule-of-law values protects the legitimacy of courts and judicial 
decisionmaking.138 An opinion contrary to rule-of-law values, by 
contrast, erodes the legitimacy of courts and judicial 
decisionmaking.139 The rule of law has its limits, though. No active 
participant in the legal system or observant legal scholar would 
contend that extant legal principles fully determine the outcome of 
every case. To one degree or another, judicial discretion and 
 
 136. See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial 
Constraints: A Response to Macey and Miller, 45 VAND. L. REV. 673, 685 (1992) (“In the case of 
statutory interpretation, the ‘duty to the rules of law’ is generally recognized to carry with it the 
obligation for the judge to do her best to interpret what Congress has said before she moves on 
to decide a case explicitly on her own policy preferences. . . . Whether or not a judge personally 
accepts this view of her role, the dominant legal culture that restrains and evaluates judges 
forces judges to adhere to it, at least in form.”). 
 137. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal 
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 838–39 (1991) (“In our law, however, the exercise of a 
power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter carries with it an obligation to explain the 
grounds upon which the interpreter gives that authoritative judgment. If we begin with the 
notion that giving such reasons will occur to us only in circumstances in which different 
approaches produce different results, the argument moves back a step. We, or the authoritative 
interpreter, must be able to state why some particular approach to reason-giving is a legitimate 
way to give authoritative meaning to the words of the text.”). 
 138. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of 
Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 287 (1992) (“Judges, more than other political 
actors, must answer the question of why anyone should obey. The president has the army, 
Congress the purse. Judges have reason. . . . The rule of law attracts formidable support only so 
long as people believe that there is a rule of law and not a rule by judges. . . . [I]t is most unlikely 
that obedience will long be forthcoming to an institution that appears to be simply 
subcommittee chairmen wearing robes.”). 
 139. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1120 (1992) (“As in constitutional interpretation, scholars in the 
statutory field are confronted with the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty—the problem of 
life-tenured, unelected judges making policy decisions. If all or most statutory cases turn on 
policy factors left to the judge’s choice, how can that exercise of power be considered 
legitimate?”). 
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extralegal factors affect both judicial decisionmaking and case 
outcomes.140 Regardless of which factors actually drive an outcome, a 
desire to adhere to rule-of-law values encourages judges to offer 
justifications in their legal opinions that sidestep extralegal factors 
and to portray their legal opinions as driven by the law of 
interpretation.141 Rule-of-law values, in other words, prompt courts to 
justify and explain their decisions as grounded in and following from 
extant legal principles.142 Courts seek to ground their opinions in rule-
of-law values even when the law alone cannot fully decide the case. 
Thus, courts often oversell the ability of the law of interpretation to 
determine outcomes. This observation holds true even in those 
situations in which an exercise of legally unconstrained judicial 
discretion might be thought unavoidable. 
Consider a situation—unlike that in Arlington Central—in which 
the underlying statutory materials were truly ambiguous.143 When 
statutory materials are ambiguous, by definition, they are subject to 
more than one legally justifiable and plausible interpretation. As 
such, the power of the law to determine outcomes in cases of genuine 
ambiguity is very limited. In explaining their decisions in these kinds 
of cases, courts typically accentuate the role played by the law of 
interpretation, while obscuring or omitting the role played by judicial 
discretion and extralegal factors. In Smith v. United States,144 for 
example, the Supreme Court was required to interpret a federal 
 
 140. See Ward Farnsworth, Signature of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal 
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 51 (2005) (“Everyone suspects that Supreme Court justices’ own 
views of policy play a part in their decisions, but the size and nature of the part is a matter of 
vague impression and frequent dispute.”). 
 141. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 41 (stating that “[l]egalism . . . hypothesizes that judicial 
decisions are determined by ‘the law,’” that “the legalist theory of judging . . . remains the 
judiciary’s ‘official’ theory of judicial behavior,” that the Supreme Court claims adherence to 
legalism because it is “a political court . . . especially in need of protective coloration,” and that 
“the legalist slogan is ‘the rule of law’”); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND 
POLITICAL TRIALS, at x (1986) (“[T]he quest for the holy grail of perfect, nonpolitical, aloof 
neutral law and legal decisions . . . remains a test for acceptability.”). 
 142. Presumably, not only the justifications for judicial decisions, but also judicial decisions 
themselves, should be driven by legal norms. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 987, 991 (2008) (offering a nonconsequentialist argument in support of the courts’ 
obligation to “not only justify their decisions, [but also] make the reasons for their decisions 
publicly available”). 
 143. In this kind of case, courts do not necessarily face interpretive choice. Rather than 
choosing among competing injunctive interpretive principles, courts apply the same or similar 
interpretive principles but nonetheless grapple with conflicting, plausible constructions of a 
given statute. 
 144. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
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statute that imposed a minimum prison sentence for any defendant 
who, “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm.”145 By a 6–3 vote, the Court held 
that the word “uses” in the statute encompasses not only discharging 
or brandishing a firearm, but also bartering drugs in exchange for a 
firearm.146 Though the statutory text was ambiguous147 and the 
evidence of legislative intent was both sparse148 and inconclusive,149 
both the majority and the dissent in Smith framed their chosen 
interpretations as deriving from the law of interpretation. The 
majority adopted a broad interpretation and cast its chosen 
interpretation as following from application of the ordinary-meaning 
principle150 and the whole-act rule.151 The dissent advocated a narrow 
 
 145. Id. at 227 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 146. Id. at 241. 
 147. The 6–3 split at the Supreme Court level and the split among the circuit courts attest to 
the ambiguity of the language. See id. at 227 (discussing the circuit split). Nonetheless, and 
somewhat incredibly, both the Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions maintained that 
the statutory text was clear and not ambiguous. See id. at 239–40 (arguing that the rule of lenity 
should not apply because the statute was not ambiguous); id. at 246–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the statutory text was not ambiguous but that if it were, the rule of lenity should 
apply). 
 148. United States v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that “the 
legislative history of § 924 is ‘sparse’” (quoting United States v. Moore, 580 F.2d 360, 362 (9th 
Cir. 1978))). 
 149. The Supreme Court majority thought its expansive interpretation of the phrase was 
consistent with legislative intent and statutory purpose. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 240 (“Imposing a 
more restrictive reading of the phrase ‘uses . . . a firearm’ does violence not only to the structure 
and language of the statute, but to its purpose as well. . . . We therefore see no reason why 
Congress would have intended courts and juries applying § 924(c)(1) to draw a fine 
metaphysical distinction between a gun’s role in a drug offense as a weapon and its role as an 
item of barter . . . .” (first omission in original)). The Ninth Circuit, however, understood that 
Congress intended the statutory phrase to be limited to the use of a gun “as an offensive 
weapon” and not as an item of barter. See Phelps, 877 F.2d at 30 (discussing statutory purpose 
and legislative intent before concluding “that the mere presence of a firearm does not trigger 
the statute” because “Congress directed the statute at ‘persons who chose to carry a firearm as 
an offensive weapon for a specific criminal act’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 314 n.10 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492)).  
 150. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 228 (citing the ordinary-meaning principle, which dictates that 
“[w]hen a word is not defined by statute, [the court should] normally construe it in accord with 
its ordinary or natural meaning”). 
 151. See id. at 233 (citing the whole-act principle, which provides that “[a] provision that 
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme 
because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or 
because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible 
with the rest of the law” (quoting United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 
371 (1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
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interpretation and cast its interpretation as following—ironically—
from the ordinary-meaning principle and from whole-act analysis.152 
Because both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Smith 
offered plausible readings of the word “used” in the sentencing 
statute, their respective interpretations were both, in a limited way, 
derived from the application of injunctive interpretive principles. 
Indeed, both opinions emphasized how their chosen interpretations 
followed from application of the ordinary-meaning and whole-act-
rule interpretive principles. Thus, the opinions adhered to rule-of-law 
values by offering the appearance that the outcomes were required by 
extant legal principles.153 
Importantly, however, neither opinion in Smith confronted or 
discussed the pivotal question: What factors referee between two 
plausible but divergent understandings of ordinary meaning? Nothing 
in the law of interpretation can locate a single ordinary meaning for 
the word “uses” in the sentencing statute. In Smith, the underlying 
statutory text was fraught with irreducible ambiguity. Indeed, Smith 
seemed to be a case in which the precise outer contours of the word 
“uses”—specifically, as to whether that word included or excluded 
bartering drugs for a gun—took no discernible shape until after the 
Court had interpreted the statute. 
To select between two plausible understandings of the word 
“uses,” a court necessarily must exercise legally unconstrained 
judicial discretion and must resort to considerations outside the law of 
interpretation. Yet neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting 
opinion in Smith acknowledged the role of judicial discretion or 
discussed the decisive extralegal factors. To the contrary, both 
opinions cast their favored interpretations as derived from the 
application of injunctive interpretive principles. Both opinions, in 
other words, portrayed the law of interpretation as doing more work 
in determining the meaning of the statute than it possibly could have 
done, and also portrayed judicial discretion and extralegal 
considerations as lesser ingredients than they necessarily must have 
been. 
 
 152. See id. at 242, 245–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the ordinary-meaning principle to 
explain that “[i]n the search for statutory meaning, [the Court will] give nontechnical words and 
phrases their ordinary meaning” and later employing whole-act analysis to emphasize the 
difference between “using” and “carrying” a firearm). 
 153. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 135, at 155–56 (arguing that a court must deny that it makes law 
and must instead assert dishonestly that legal norms determine outcomes). 
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The same phenomenon appears in cases of interpretive choice 
such as Arlington Central. In these cases, the law of interpretation is 
not called upon to clarify ambiguous statutory materials. Rather, the 
underlying statutory materials—statutory text and evidence of 
legislative intent—are individually unambiguous but collectively 
inconsistent. Nonetheless, because the law of interpretation lacks 
ordering principles, courts necessarily must exercise legally 
unconstrained judicial discretion to select between conflicting 
injunctive interpretive principles. Yet, as seen in the cases applying 
IDEA § 1415, the pull of rule-of-law values encourages courts to 
portray the law of interpretation, rather than judicial discretion and 
extralegal factors, as the key element driving the selection. By casting 
the law of interpretation as definitively favoring statutory text over 
legislative intent, or vice versa, courts portray the outcome as driven 
by extant legal principles. The avoidance maneuver, in short, enables 
the reasoning in judicial opinions to adhere to rule-of-law values and, 
in turn, seeks to enhance or at least to preserve the legitimacy of 
judicial decisionmaking.154 
The avoidance maneuver, however, comes at a price. Though the 
avoidance maneuver may enable judicial opinions to adhere to rule-
of-law values and to preserve the legitimacy of judicial action, courts 
deploying it portray the law of interpretation as though it includes 
ordering principles that establish hierarchies of injunctive interpretive 
norms. This misrepresents the law of interpretation. Moreover, 
because courts portray the law of interpretation as determinative 
when they deploy the avoidance maneuver, they fail to offer a public 
discussion of the extralegal considerations that are in fact crucial to 
the ultimate outcome. 
Despite these problems, courts almost universally respond to 
interpretive choice with the avoidance maneuver. Legal opinions that 
openly acknowledge that the law of interpretation fails to favor 
certain injunctive interpretive principles over others are rare, if they 
exist at all. None of the opinions interpreting the expert-witness fee-
shifting provision of the IDEA declared that the law of interpretation 
is indifferent between textualist or intentionalist principles. None of 
 
 154. See Zeppos, supra note 139, at 1122 (“In statutory cases, judges are regularly 
confronted with the need to make value or policy choices. . . . Citation to authority provides a 
basis for the judge’s choice other than her own personal preferences. The use of authority allows 
the judge to express a value choice while claiming that the policy preference finds support in a 
recognized legal authority.”). 
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the opinions declared that the court faced a legally unconstrained 
choice between conflicting interpretive principles and incompatible 
interpretations of IDEA § 1415. None of the opinions declared that 
the court had to go outside the law of interpretation to arrive at its 
outcome. Instead, every opinion deployed the avoidance maneuver.155 
III.  TRANSPARENT JUSTIFICATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
AVOIDANCE MANEUVER  
Courts have another option. Rather than deploying some 
variation of the avoidance maneuver, judges could respond to 
interpretive choice by writing opinions characterized by transparent 
justification. Transparent justification would entail acknowledging 
that the law of interpretation generates an interpretive choice and 
then openly explaining the extralegal factors that led the court to 
choose one legally valid interpretation over another interpretation of 
equal legal validity. In the context of the IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting 
provision, transparent justification would mean an opinion that (1) 
openly acknowledged that when unambiguous statutory text and 
unambiguous legislative intent clash, the law of interpretation favors 
neither textualist nor intentionalist principles; (2) openly 
acknowledged that the law of interpretation sanctions two opposing 
IDEA § 1415 interpretations of equal legal validity; and (3) offered a 
frank and full explanation of the extralegal factors that persuaded the 
Court to favor one legally valid interpretation over a different 
interpretation of equal legal validity. 
Unlike the avoidance maneuver, transparent justification does 
not involve any misrepresentation of the law of interpretation. It 
instead obliges courts to offer a public explanation of the factors 
beyond the law of interpretation that help determine outcomes. In 
other words, the avoidance maneuver’s liabilities are transparent 
justification’s assets.  
Conversely, although transparent justification eliminates the 
more problematic aspects of the avoidance maneuver, it also 
eliminates the avoidance maneuver’s main putative virtue: adherence 
to rule-of-law values. Admittedly, transparent justification represents 
the antithesis of rule-of-law values. Rather than seeking to explain 
how a judicial interpretation of a statute follows from a neutral 
application of the law of interpretation, it does the opposite. It seeks 
 
 155. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 75–99. 
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to explain why a judicial interpretation cannot follow from 
application of the law of interpretation alone. It concedes the role of 
legally unconstrained judicial discretion and judicial reliance on 
factors outside the law of interpretation. 
The overwhelming dominance of the avoidance maneuver in 
cases of interpretive choice suggests that courts estimate that 
transparent justification would be so inimical to rule-of-law values 
that its costs—potential damage to the legitimacy of judicial 
decisionmaking—would outweigh any possible benefits. At a 
minimum, judges must perceive the cost-benefit ratio of the 
avoidance maneuver to be more favorable than the cost-benefit ratio 
of transparent justification. 
This reasoning is fundamentally flawed. Ultimately, the case in 
favor of the avoidance maneuver is weaker than it might first appear, 
and the case in favor of transparent justification is stronger than most 
might believe. I do not argue, however, that reasonable minds must 
unanimously resolve that courts should jettison the avoidance 
maneuver in favor of transparent justification. The appeal of apparent 
adherence to rule-of-law values is not trivial, and, therefore, the case 
in favor of the avoidance maneuver is not wholly devoid of value. 
Moreover, transparent justification is unconventional, and courts 
might therefore approach it with trepidation. Accordingly, I argue 
only that the case in favor of the avoidance maneuver is weak 
enough, and the case in favor of transparent justification is strong 
enough, that reasonable minds could, at the very least, disagree over 
which option represents the better judicial response to interpretive 
choice.  
Courts, however, have universally rejected transparent 
justification and have embraced the avoidance maneuver. The judicial 
response to interpretive choice should not be so one-sided. The 
merits and demerits of the two alternatives are close enough that 
courts should give more serious consideration to transparent 
justification, and at least some courts should conclude that 
transparent justification is the better alternative.156 
 
 156. Only a few judges openly acknowledge the limits of legal norms and the role of 
extralegal policy factors in their decisionmaking. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 135, at 123–26 
(suggesting that judges’ self-interest may shape judicial practices); Barak, supra note 34, at 33–
36 (noting that society’s perception of the judicial role influences judicial activity). 
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A. Why Transparent Justification Does Not Undermine Rule-of-Law 
Values 
I begin with the source of the supposed weakness of transparent 
justification and the supposed strength of the avoidance maneuver: 
adherence—or the lack thereof—to rule-of-law values. If courts were 
to deploy transparent justification in cases of interpretive choice, they 
would offer opinions antithetical to rule-of-law values and thus 
adverse to the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. Or so critics 
would argue.157 It is true that transparent justification does not strive 
toward adherence to rule-of-law values. By acknowledging that the 
law of interpretation does not resolve interpretive choices, courts 
would be candidly declaring that cases’ outcomes are determined not 
by law, but instead by legally unconstrained judicial discretion and 
extralegal factors. 
Imagine, for example, how Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in 
Arlington Central might have read if it had deployed transparent 
justification. The Arlington Central dissent relied heavily on the 
principle that the law of interpretation favors clearly expressed 
legislative intent over the most linguistically natural reading of 
statutory text.158 Had the dissent deployed transparent justification, it 
would have done several things: First, it would have noted that the 
law of interpretation encompasses two equally valid but contradictory 
principles—one that favors legislative intent over statutory text, and 
one that favors the ordinary meaning of the text over contrary 
evidence of legislative intent. Second, the dissent would have 
conceded that nothing in the law of interpretation determines which 
of these adverse injunctive interpretive principles is legally superior 
and, therefore, that the Court had to look outside the law of 
interpretation to make its own determination. Third, the dissent 
would have enumerated and discussed the factors outside the law of 
interpretation that led the Court to favor one injunctive interpretive 
principle over another. 
None of this analysis would have adhered to the rule-of-law 
prescription that judges should decide cases in accordance with extant 
 
 157. Courts are expected to offer justifications for their decisions that are rooted in the 
application of legal principles rather than extralegal factors. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an 
Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 490 (noting that 
“the official line of the legal culture is still that judges are rule-bound in their decisions”); supra 
note 135. 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 101–14. 
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legal norms and should avoid resorting to extralegal considerations. 
Courts are in closest adherence to rule-of-law values when they base 
their decisions on preexisting legal norms rather than on extralegal 
factors.159 In other words, from a rule-of-law perspective, the 
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking stands on the most secure 
footing when courts can credibly claim that the application of 
preexisting, unambiguous legal norms leads to a single, unequivocal 
outcome. In these situations, courts can credibly claim that the law—
and not extralegal factors, such as policy considerations or the 
personal preferences of the judge or judges—determined the case’s 
outcome. By responding to interpretive choice with transparent 
justification, though, the dissenting opinion in Arlington Central 
would have entertained no pretense that the law had been 
determinative or that judicial discretion and factors outside the law of 
interpretation had been immaterial.  
Herein lies the supposed problem with transparent justification: 
any legal opinion deploying transparent justification acknowledges a 
situation diametrically opposed to the situation most in adherence to 
rule-of-law values and most protective of the legitimacy of judicial 
decisionmaking. At bottom, however, this problem is inherent not so 
much in the technique of transparent justification but rather in 
interpretive choice itself. True, a court responding to an interpretive 
choice with transparent justification could not credibly claim that the 
law of interpretation pointed to a singular legally superior outcome or 
that factors outside of the law of interpretation were not 
determinative. And true, a court using transparent justification could 
not expect any legitimacy-preserving effect via supposed adherence to 
rule-of-law values. 
But transparent justification is not itself the real reason behind 
these truths—the law of interpretation is. Because the law of 
interpretation contains no ordering principles, it cannot referee 
conflicts between competing injunctive interpretive principles. A 
court necessarily must rely on extralegal factors and necessarily will 
exercise legally unconstrained discretion when selecting between 
competing injunctive interpretive principles and consequent 
competing interpretations. Nothing in the way that judges choose to 
explain or justify the selection they make can change this reality. 
Whether a court decides to admit this fact openly—as in transparent 
 
 159. See supra note 135. 
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justification—or to obscure it—through the avoidance maneuver—is 
irrelevant and beside the point. 
Stated differently, the problem of a lack of adherence to rule-of-
law values and the corresponding debasement of the legitimacy of 
judicial decisionmaking do not stem from the use of transparent 
justification. Instead, they are part and parcel of the phenomenon of 
interpretive choice. Cases presenting an interpretive choice belong 
inescapably to the class of cases in which legally unconstrained 
judicial discretion and extralegal considerations, rather than extant 
legal norms, will be the ultimate determinants. Courts deploying the 
avoidance maneuver may simulate adherence to rule-of-law values.160 
In reality, however, in cases of interpretive choice, adherence to rule-
of-law values is not fully possible. In cases of interpretive choice, the 
law of interpretation can do no more than narrow the field of choice 
to opposing interpretations of equal legal validity. Legally 
unconstrained judicial discretion and extralegal factors will ultimately 
select between these opposing interpretations. 
B. Why the Avoidance Maneuver Does Not Enhance Rule-of-Law 
Values 
The avoidance maneuver cannot alter the brute fact that, in cases 
of interpretive choice, the law of interpretation is not the deciding 
factor. At best, all the avoidance maneuver can do is drape judicial 
discretion in a rule-of-law façade. The supposed benefit of the 
avoidance maneuver, therefore, is no benefit at all. Or it would be a 
benefit only if its obfuscatory gambit deceived relevant audiences into 
believing that the law of interpretation determines outcomes. But the 
avoidance maneuver almost always fails to deceive relevant 
audiences. 
The audiences closest to a legal dispute—lawyers and litigants—
will not be deceived easily. In a case such as Arlington Central, the 
notion that the lawyers and litigants might be duped into accepting 
that the law of interpretation decidedly and uncontroversially favors 
clear statutory text over clear contrary legislative intent approaches 
the absurd. The lawyers in Arlington Central were fully aware that the 
law of interpretation does not definitively establish whether textualist 
 
 160. See Zeppos, supra note 139, at 1121 (“Judges might perform [a] legitimating function 
by lying or deception—that is, by acting as if originalist or textual sources alone compel a result 
and not revealing the real grounds for decision.”). 
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or intentionalist injunctive principles should prevail.161 If nothing else, 
the attorneys would have noted that the various IDEA § 1415 cases in 
the lower courts had vacillated in reliance on diametrically opposed 
injunctive interpretive principles.162 As such, they would understand 
that the inclinations and dispositions of five Supreme Court Justices, 
rather than the law of interpretation, would determine whether text 
or contrary legislative intent would prevail. A mere judicial assertion 
that the law of interpretation demands that statutory text trump 
contrary legislative intent could not have persuaded the litigating 
attorneys to believe that judicial discretion and extralegal factors 
were immaterial.163 Indeed, if judges could deceive lawyers merely by 
proclaiming that the law of interpretation unequivocally requires that 
clear text trump contrary clear legislative intent, one should be 
worried not about the legitimacy of courts, but rather about the 
judicial system as a whole. Any legal system populated by attorneys 
unable to pierce such a transparent distortion of the law would fall 
into terminal dysfunction. 
In a way, courts that deploy the avoidance maneuver are 
audacious to the point of imprudence. Opinions deploying the 
avoidance maneuver confidently maintain that the law of 
interpretation contemplates certain hierarchies of injunctive 
interpretive principles. But they make this claim in the face of 
dissenting opinions, previous opinions from the same court, and 
previous opinions from other courts that claim just as confidently that 
the law of interpretation contemplates the exact opposite hierarchy of 
 
 161. The litigants’ Supreme Court briefs included extensive discussions of the conflicting 
injunctive interpretive principles. See Brief of Petitioner at 21–24, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (No. 05-18) (arguing that the statutory language is 
unambiguous and that the Second Circuit therefore erred in relying on legislative history to 
construe the IDEA); Brief of Respondent at 16–17, 30, Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. 291 (No. 05-
18) (asserting that the legislative history, the plain meaning of the statutory text, and sources 
contemporary to the statute indicated that the IDEA authorized the respondents to recover the 
cost of their expert’s participation); Brief for the National Disability Rights Network and the 
Center for Law and Education as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17, 28, Arlington 
Cent., 548 U.S. 291 (No. 05-18) (arguing that the provision must be read in the context of the 
rest of the IDEA and its legislative history). 
 162. See supra note 77. 
 163. The simple fact that five Supreme Court Justices joined an opinion claiming that the 
law of interpretation grants statutory text a trump over legislative intent, whereas three Justices 
joined a dissent maintaining the exact opposite, undermines any argument in support of the 
avoidance maneuver’s ability to deceive. A judicial assertion that the law of interpretation 
demands X, countered by a judicial assertion that the law of interpretation demands not-X, only 
reinforces the reality that the law of interpretation fails to resolve whether X or not-X should 
prevail. 
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injunctive interpretive principles. Plausible arguments might 
reasonably contend that unvarnished and all-inclusive candor is not 
always the best policy for courts.164 Perhaps a judicial white lie is a 
necessary expedient in some situations. A judicial white lie, however, 
is inadvisable when it is obviously and demonstrably erroneous. Or, at 
least, the obviously erroneous judicial white lie should be the rare 
exception rather than the universal rule of judicial justification. If the 
avoidance maneuver convinced lawyers and their clients that the law 
of interpretation decides cases involving interpretive choices, then it 
might produce some salutary effect in terms of preserving the 
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. In the end, however, the 
avoidance maneuver’s feigned adherence to rule-of-law values is too 
easily detected.165 Any supposed legitimacy-enhancing effect is 
therefore nugatory and probably even counterproductive. 
If the avoidance maneuver does not deceive litigants and their 
lawyers, what about the broader relevant audience? Might the 
avoidance maneuver’s illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values 
preserve the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking in the eyes of the 
general public? Though lawyers understand the basic features of the 
law of interpretation, the general public is, understandably, less aware 
of judicial decisions as a whole. Thus, perhaps the avoidance 
maneuver might deceive the general public into believing that the law 
of interpretation resolves cases involving interpretive choices or, 
more generally, that the law, rather than legally unconstrained 
judicial discretion, determines outcomes. If this were the case, then 
the avoidance maneuver arguably might represent an imperfect but 
defensible expedient for courts facing interpretive choices. 
In the end, however, the avoidance maneuver has no salutary 
effect on the general public for the exact opposite reason that it has 
no effect on attorneys. The avoidance maneuver does not deceive 
attorneys because they know too much. They can research conflicting 
 
 164. See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 
1310 (1995) (arguing in favor of weighing the prudential value of candor against competing 
values); Schwartzman, supra note 142, at 988–99 (cataloguing the arguments against judicial 
candor); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 
358–59 (1989) (arguing that judicial candor in statutory-interpretation cases would undermine 
the legitimacy of courts). 
 165. See Francis J. Mootz, III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration That the 
Obvious Is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REV. 69, 71 (1993) (“No lawyer really believes that judges and 
administrators can apply rules derived from neutral premises without implicating their own 
values and perspectives.”). 
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injunctive interpretive principles and see that the law of 
interpretation lacks ordering principles that definitively resolve 
interpretive choices. The general public, by contrast, knows too little. 
The general public maintains only a vague awareness and 
understanding of judicial institutions and does not fully understand 
the intricacies of judicial opinions.166 Opting for transparent 
justification instead of the avoidance maneuver in cases of 
interpretive choice would cause nary a ripple in the sensibilities of the 
general public.167 Courts strive to offer opinions that adhere to rule-of-
law values, depict legal norms as determinative, and minimize or 
obscure the roles of legally unconstrained judicial discretion and 
extralegal factors. Yet if anything, the general public already 
comprehends that judges often exercise legally unconstrained 
discretion.168 Evidently, the general public is either unaware of or 
 
 166. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and 
Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 899 (2007) (finding that “public 
knowledge about . . . the courts is low”); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on 
Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 34 (2001) (“Most 
research on the public’s knowledge of the Supreme Court concludes that the public knows little 
about the Court or its workings. A regularly cited example of the public’s ignorance is that in 
1989, 71 percent could not name a single member of the Court while 54 percent of the same 
sample could name the judge on the television show ‘The People’s Court.’ That this survey 
found such results was not news to political scientists, who have long documented the minimal 
knowledge most citizens have about the Court.”); see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Court and 
Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303, 303 (John B. Gates 
& Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (stating that Supreme Court decisions “lack . . . saliency in all 
but a few situations”); Ilya Somin & Sanford Levinson, Debate, Democracy, Political Ignorance, 
and Constitutional Reform, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 239, 247–48 (2009), http://
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ConstitutionalReform.pdf (“Former Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor has recently complained that ‘[t]wo-thirds of Americans know at least one of the 
judges on the Fox TV show American Idol, but less than one in ten can name the Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Justice O’Connor)). 
 167. Not even Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), which was viewed by many commentators 
as driven by politics rather than law, and which was surely among the most widely reported 
Supreme Court cases of all time, meaningfully altered public perception of the Supreme Court. 
See Kritzer supra note 166, at 36 (finding that Bush v. Gore had only a modest short-term effect 
on public knowledge of the Supreme Court and “essentially nil” effect on approval and 
disapproval of the Supreme Court). 
 168. Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 166, at 900 (finding that “[r]oughly six in 10 
Americans (62%) say the courts in their state are legislating from the bench rather than 
interpreting the law” and that “75% say a judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her politics to a 
great or moderate extent”); Keith Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law! 
4–5 (Syracuse Univ. Coll. of Law Faculty Scholarship, Paper 56, 2009), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1404600 (citing a 2005 survey finding that “an astounding 82 percent of those 
surveyed believed that the partisan background of judges influences court decisionmaking 
either some or a lot” and that “[a] majority of poll respondents agreed that even though judges 
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unconvinced by judicial efforts to offer legal opinions adverting to 
rule-of-law values. Either way, moving away from the avoidance 
maneuver and toward transparent justification in cases of interpretive 
choice would not alter the public’s perception of the courts or of the 
judicial enterprise. 
Even if the general public remains ignorant of the avoidance 
maneuver, the attentive public must be considered. When certain 
issues come before the courts, attentive segments of the public pay 
close attention.169 One might argue that, unlike the general public, this 
attentive segment of the public will sometimes care enough about 
substantive issues to become informed about the reasoning offered in 
certain legal opinions.170 Might the avoidance maneuver preserve or 
 
always say that their decisions flow from the law and the Constitution, many judges are in fact 
basing their decisions on their own personal beliefs”). 
 169. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 64–71 (1990) 
(discussing and defining the attentive public versus the inattentive public); Stephen B. Burbank, 
Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1511, 1527 (2006) (commenting that “[s]tudy after study has shown that the public knows 
very little about the Court or its decisions, but that levels of awareness differ as between the 
attentive public . . . and the nonattentive public”); Doris Graber, Mediated Politics and 
Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 545, 563 (2004) (“While 
average citizens play important political roles in democracies, the bulk of the burden for 
political action has always been born by elected and appointed public officials and by citizens 
with above-average interest in politics whom scholars call ‘the attentive public.’ At best, that 
category comprises no more than 10% of the citizenry.”); Richard Lehne & John Reynolds, The 
Impact of Judicial Activism on Public Opinion, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 896, 901 (1978) (noting the 
difference between the attentive and the inattentive public and explaining that “[a]n unusually 
controversial court decision appears able to cross the attention threshold of some of those for 
whom the judicial system is not a matter of everyday concern”); see also Jon A. Krosnick, 
Government Policy and Citizen Passion: A Study of Issue Publics in Contemporary America, 12 
POL. BEHAV. 59, 72–75 (1990) (discussing the hypothesis that only small segments of the public 
will likely care about any given policy issue). 
 170. Alternatively, the attentive public may care primarily about the substance of Supreme 
Court decisions and relatively little about whether they are driven by extant legal principles or 
by extralegal considerations. For example, public reaction to Bush v. Gore predictably split 
sharply along party lines. Kritzer, supra note 166, at 36. Presumably, if substantive outcomes 
were not central to the public’s reaction, then the divide between favorable and unfavorable 
evaluations would not have split so clearly along partisan lines. The strong negative public 
reaction to the 2005 Supreme Court decision on eminent domain, Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005), is also consistent with the idea that substance is more important than legal 
reasoning in the attentive public’s evaluation. Kelo applied existing legal principles on eminent 
domain. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 664 (3d ed. 
2006). Nonetheless, Kelo “generated a massive backlash from across the political spectrum.” 
Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
2100, 2101 (2009). If the attentive public is more concerned with substantive outcomes than the 
intricacies of the justifications offered in judicial opinions, then the avoidance maneuver’s 
impact on attentive segments of the public will be of minimal significance. 
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enhance the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking in the eyes of 
attentive segments of the public? 
The problem that the avoidance maneuver encounters with the 
attentive public is the same problem that it faces with other attentive 
constituencies—lawyers and their clients. In the rare instances when 
the attentive public cares enough about substantive legal or policy 
issues to delve into the particulars of judicial reasoning, the attentive 
public will quickly recognize the avoidance maneuver as artifice. 
Lawyers have strong professional incentives to pay close attention to 
the reasoning of judicial opinions. Their duty to render competent 
legal representation requires it. Whether out of economic or other 
motivations, members of the attentive public may also develop strong 
reasons to pay attention to the particulars of judicial reasoning. If and 
when members of the attentive public acquaint themselves with the 
details of judicial reasoning, they will likely come to the same 
understandings as lawyers who study judicial opinions out of 
professional necessity. 
With the IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting provision, for example, 
parents of children with disabilities may be motivated to acquaint 
themselves with the IDEA, and even with cases interpreting the 
IDEA. If members of this attentive public were to read the various 
IDEA federal court opinions, three points would become just as 
conspicuous to them as to any lawyer reviewing the cases to prepare 
for professional representation: First, some federal court opinions 
applied text over conflicting legislative-intent injunctive interpretive 
principles. Second, other federal court opinions applied legislative 
intent over conflicting textual injunctive interpretive principles. 
Third, despite explicit or implicit claims to the contrary, no federal 
court was able to establish a definitive and indisputable ordering 
principle governing whether unambiguous text or contrary 
unambiguous legislative intent should prevail. Like attorneys, the 
attentive portion of the public would thus come to understand that 
the outcome in a case of interpretive choice does not depend on the 
law of interpretation, but rather on legally unconstrained judicial 
discretion and extralegal considerations.171 
 
 171. Consider two constitutional cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Bush v. Gore, 
that have generated close and impassioned attention from interested segments of the public. It 
is unlikely that the losing attentive interest groups were convinced that the law had decided the 
outcomes in those cases. In both instances, the groups likely believed that legally unconstrained 
judicial discretion and extralegal considerations were determinative. 
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Ultimately, the supposed legitimacy-preserving benefits of the 
avoidance maneuver depend on the notion that no one will notice its 
sleight of hand. And, for the most part, no one will notice. The 
general public simply does not get involved in the minutiae of the 
reasoning or the justifications offered in judicial opinions. But for 
those who are paying attention—attorneys and their clients or an 
attentive segment of the public—the sleight of hand is too noticeable 
and, therefore, is unlikely to succeed. 
Whereas the legitimacy-enhancing benefits of the avoidance 
maneuver are speculative at best, the costs associated with 
transparent justification are minimal or even nonexistent. Again, 
transparent justification itself is not at odds with or contrary to rule-
of-law values. The nature of the law of interpretation, with its lack of 
ordering principles, generates interpretive choices and scenarios 
under which the law of interpretation cannot fully determine 
outcomes. Transparent justification would not produce this state of 
affairs but would instead merely acknowledge its existence. 
Just as the avoidance maneuver preserves the legitimacy of 
judicial decisionmaking only if it succeeds in deceiving relevant 
audiences, transparent justification damages the legitimacy of judicial 
decisionmaking only if it offers relevant audiences damaging 
information that they did not previously know. But transparent 
justification does not provide any information that interested 
audiences do not already know or that, upon examination, is not 
already obvious. 
Thus, had the majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington 
Central openly stated that the law of interpretation does not 
definitively determine whether unambiguous text trumps 
unambiguous contrary legislative intent, the opinions would not have 
provided any information that the lawyers did not already know, at 
least on some level. Attorneys realize and can explain to their clients 
that the law of interpretation does not definitively settle whether 
unambiguous text or unambiguous legislative intent is superior. They 
know that in cases like Arlington Central, the outcome will turn more 
on legally unconstrained discretionary decisions of the judges than on 
the law of interpretation. The litigation history of Arlington Central 
confirms this reality: several opinions privileged the clear text of the 
IDEA over its contrary but clear legislative history,172 and other 
 
 172. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 79–81, 87–89. 
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opinions did the exact opposite,173 but no opinion offered an 
incontrovertible and authoritative rule determining whether text or 
contrary intent should prevail.174 Courts employing transparent 
justification would announce that the law of interpretation does not 
determine how a court should interpret the IDEA. Yet because any 
attorney who has read the relevant legal materials and accompanying 
cases will plainly see this anyway, transparent justification itself would 
not erode the legitimacy of courts or judicial decisionmaking any 
more than the phenomenon of interpretive choice itself already has. 
In the end, most of the merits and demerits of both the 
avoidance maneuver and transparent justification turn on the 
understandings and intellectual capabilities of the relevant audiences. 
On the one hand, assume that lawyers, clients, and attentive 
audiences already know or can easily come to understand both that 
the law of interpretation is not determinative in cases of interpretive 
choice and that courts often exercise legally unconstrained discretion. 
In that case, the avoidance maneuver will fail to achieve an illusion of 
adherence to rule-of-law values. Transparent justification, in turn, has 
no downside cost, as nobody in the relevant audience will be 
surprised to be informed that the law of interpretation cannot fully 
determine outcomes. On the other hand, assume that lawyers, clients, 
and attentive audiences do not realize that courts often exercise 
legally unconstrained discretion. In that case, perhaps the avoidance 
maneuver will succeed in perpetuating their ignorance and, thereby, 
in preserving an illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values. 
But could it possibly be true that those few who pay close 
attention to the finer points of reasoning and justification offered in 
judicial opinions will fail to understand that the law of interpretation 
alone does not determine outcomes in cases of interpretive choice? 
Those who favor the avoidance maneuver and oppose transparent 
justification are put in the difficult position of arguing that practicing 
attorneys, their clients, and attentive segments of the public are 
ignorant of—or are incapable of discovering—basic and easily 
verifiable features of the law of interpretation. 
 
 173. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 89–99. 
 174. See supra notes 76–77. 
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C. How the Avoidance Maneuver Erodes the Honesty and Quality of 
Judicial Opinions, Diminishes the Legitimacy of Courts, and Fails 
To Constrain Discretion 
Several additional points speak in favor of transparent 
justification and against the avoidance maneuver. First, adherence to 
rule-of-law values is but one of several considerations relevant to 
judicial legitimacy.175 A judicial decision that genuinely adheres to 
rule-of-law values might still lack legitimacy if it produces a dreadful 
substantive outcome.176 Similarly, a judicial decision produced by a 
denial of due process is of dubious legitimacy, even if it genuinely 
adheres to other rule-of-law values.177 The point is not to suggest that 
adherence to rule-of-law values is unimportant, but rather that 
adherence to rule-of-law values is one of several competing factors 
that helps assess the legitimacy of a judicial decision. In their zeal to 
create an illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values, courts deploying 
the avoidance maneuver seem to have discounted other important 
considerations. 
Importantly, courts deploying the avoidance maneuver discount 
the legitimacy-eroding effects of misrepresenting the law of 
interpretation. Even conceding the tenuous proposition that the 
avoidance maneuver’s illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values 
produces a legitimacy-preserving effect, the avoidance maneuver 
requires courts to be dishonest about the nature of the law of 
interpretation and the role it plays in determining outcomes. This 
dishonesty diminishes or even annuls any purported legitimacy-
 
 175. Both Professors Joseph Raz and Frank Cross make this point. JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule 
of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 228 (1979) (“[The] rule of law . . . . has 
always to be balanced against competing claims of other values.”); Frank B. Cross, What Do 
Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 209 (2009) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 34) (arguing that 
“[t]he rule of law is certainly exalted in our society, but [that] its virtue must be kept in 
perspective” and that competing values are also important to legitimacy). 
 176. See Cross, supra note 175, at 209 (arguing that popular preferences or pragmatic 
concerns can be as important as adherence to rule-of-law values and, thus, that Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), “were bad decisions even 
if they were consistent with the rule of law,” and Brown v. Board of Education, 247 U.S. 483 
(1954), “was a good decision even if it was inconsistent with [rule-of-law] value[s]”); Neil S. 
Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 971–73 (2008) (discussing how 
factors other than fidelity to the rule of law are important to the legitimacy of the courts and 
how, in some instances, fidelity to the rule of law can harm the legitimacy of the courts).  
 177. Imagine, for example, a judge who accepts a bribe in exchange for granting summary 
judgment to the bribe offeror. Such a judicial decision would be illegitimate under any 
reasonable conception, even if it happened to adhere to the unambiguous requirements of 
uncontradicted preexisting legal norms. 
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preserving effect that the avoidance maneuver’s façade of adherence 
to rule-of-law values might produce.178 Those who defend the 
avoidance maneuver as a lesser evil when compared with transparent 
justification necessarily must argue against candor and in favor of 
deception. 
Second, the avoidance maneuver is problematic not only because 
of what it includes in an opinion—misrepresentation of the law of 
interpretation—but also because of what it leaves out: public 
discussion of the decisive extralegal factors. By casting the law of 
interpretation as determinative, a court avoids discussion of the 
extralegal factors that had an influence over the disposition of the 
issue at hand. Transparent justification, in contrast, would oblige 
courts to publicly account for and discuss these determinative 
extralegal factors. In Arlington Central, the law of interpretation 
could not have determined whether statutory text or contrary 
legislative intent should have prevailed. Yet neither the majority nor 
the dissent offered a public discussion of the determinative extralegal 
factors. This omission erodes the legitimacy of the Court’s decision. 
Consider how the losing litigant in Arlington Central might 
analyze the legitimacy of the Court’s decision. The Court’s majority 
argued that the law of interpretation favored textualist rather than 
intentionalist injunctive principles. Despite the rule-of-law 
pretensions in the Court’s opinion, the losing litigant knows that the 
law of interpretation did not determine the outcome, that extralegal 
considerations drove the Court’s choice, and that in other cases the 
same Court chose to privilege intent over text.179 Yet rather than 
explicate the determinative extralegal factors, the Court minimized 
the role of judicial discretion and extralegal factors and cast its 
decision as dictated by the law of interpretation. Losing in litigation is 
 
 178. See Idleman, supra note 164, at 1309–10 (“The conventional wisdom . . . is apparently 
that candor is an ideal toward which judges should almost always aspire and that any exceptions 
to this rule are few and far between. . . . [T]he normative position that judges ought to be 
forthcoming in their pronouncements would appear to be virtually unassailable. It might seem 
difficult to imagine . . . a theory of judging that would explicitly reject the conventional wisdom 
in favor of a view that judges may be anything less than candid.” (footnote omitted)). 
 179. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133–29 (2000) 
(favoring legislative intent over clear contrary statutory text); Anita S. Krishnakumar, The 
Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The Unique National Institution Canon, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1053, 1081–82 (2009) (“Although the statutory text clearly gave the FDA 
authority to regulate ‘drugs’ and ‘devices,’ the Court . . . concluded that Congress could not have 
intended . . . to give the FDA authority to regulate, and in effect ban, tobacco products.” 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)–(h) (1994 & Supp. III 1998))). 
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hard. Losing and realizing that the Court sidestepped a public airing 
of the decisive factors and instead offered vaporous legal fictions as a 
justification is harder. Had the Court employed transparent 
justification rather than the avoidance maneuver, at least the losing 
litigant would have had the consolation of a candid public accounting 
of the decisive extralegal factors. 
Third, transparent justification might do more than the 
avoidance maneuver to constrain judicial discretion. An obligation to 
offer a public discussion of the extralegal factors that motivated the 
selection of certain injunctive interpretive principles might inhibit 
courts from relying on certain publicly unacceptable extralegal 
considerations. In Arlington Central, for example, had the Court 
employed transparent justification, the discussion might have 
centered on publicly palatable extralegal factors that would have 
bolstered the legitimacy of the decision. For example, as an extralegal 
reason for favoring text over contrary legislative intent, the Court 
could have said that its approach would create incentives for 
Congress to engage in more careful legislative drafting.180 The dissent, 
in turn, might have argued that enforcing the most natural textual 
meaning would simply create unnecessary work for Congress, which 
would have to waste time amending the text of the statute.181 
Although these are extralegal policy considerations, not part of the 
law of interpretation, they are nonpartisan, principled, and aimed at 
improving the legislative process. As such, these sorts of extralegal 
considerations would have been publicly palatable and might have 
even bolstered the legitimacy of the Court’s decision. 
By contrast, the Justices in the majority presumably would not 
have stated that they favored textualist principles over intentionalist 
principles merely because the former produced the outcome most 
consistent with the politically conservative interest of minimizing the 
 
 180. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679, 
685 n.30 (1999) (discussing and citing works that suggest that textualist statutory interpretation 
can improve the legislative process); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional 
Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 175, 204 (1992) (“One often-cited goal of textualism is to induce Congress to legislate with 
care and precision.”). 
 181. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113–16 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that the examples of statutory amendments passed by Congress in 
response to textualist interpretations counsel against textualism and in favor of intentionalism); 
see also Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 887, 909–11 (2000) (finding that textualist bankruptcy code decisions necessitate 
congressional override more often than do pragmatic interpretive decisions). 
GONZALEZ IN PRINTER PROOF 11/12/2011 3:36:36 PM 
642 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:583 
impact and cost of government regulation. Such a statement would 
only have eroded the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s decision. 
Because the avoidance maneuver does not oblige courts to publicly 
discuss determinative extralegal factors, publicly unacceptable 
extralegal factors can determine outcomes far too easily. Transparent 
justification, however, might in some instances deter courts from 
relying on these unacceptable factors.182  
Fourth and relatedly, transparent justification might push courts 
to engage in more careful self-analysis, which could encourage 
decisions of higher quality. Under the avoidance maneuver, it is very 
easy for courts to simply cite an applicable injunctive interpretive 
principle that supports a given interpretation and call it a day. 
Transparent justification would instead force courts to ask and 
answer additional questions: Does the law of interpretation sanction 
competing applicable injunctive interpretive principles? If so, why 
should a court choose a particular injunctive interpretive principle—
and consequent interpretation—over a competing injunctive 
interpretive principle and consequent interpretation? These 
additional questions might push courts to consider angles that they 
might not otherwise have considered.  
This argument should not be overstated. At the Supreme Court 
level, the Justices usually have ample opportunity and incentive to 
consider every angle and every potentially applicable interpretive 
principle. Some of the opinions issued by lower federal courts on 
IDEA § 1415, however, offered no evidence that the courts even 
considered competing injunctive interpretive principles.183 These 
opinions are consistent with the notion that the avoidance maneuver 
enables courts to engage in a somewhat perfunctory analysis of 
applicable principles of interpretation. Had these courts been 
operating under the obligations of transparent justification, they 
might have engaged in a deeper and more thorough analysis of the 
law of interpretation. This, in turn, could only have positive effects on 
the quality of their decisions. 
 
 182. Judge Richard Posner makes a similar point in defending pragmatic judging. Judge 
Posner argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, if judges acknowledge that they often 
exercise legally unconstrained discretion, they will be more circumspect in exercising discretion 
than if they operate under the false impression that the law dictates outcomes. POSNER, supra 
note 34, at 252. 
 183. Those lower court opinions that deployed the second variation of the avoidance 
maneuver by offering no discussion of competing interpretive principles are most consistent 
with this idea. See supra text accompanying notes 122–28. 
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Finally, if transparent justification engenders deeper analysis of 
the law of interpretation, over time it could prompt courts to improve 
the law of interpretation, or even to develop now-absent ordering 
principles. Currently, the law of interpretation offers little more than 
legal platitudes for grappling with interpretive choices. The avoidance 
maneuver allows courts to freely select reliance on a text-over-intent 
platitude: “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of 
the courts at least where the disposition required by the text is not 
absurd is to enforce it according to its terms.”184 Alternatively, courts 
deploying the avoidance maneuver can freely select an intent-over-
text platitude: when “literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters[,] . . . . the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict 
language, controls.”185 Transparent justification would obligate courts 
to go beyond these legal platitudes and acknowledge that the law of 
interpretation does not resolve interpretive choices. And if courts are 
forced to acknowledge the limits of the law of interpretation, they 
might develop principled ways for resolving those limits. Thus, were 
courts to jettison the avoidance maneuver and employ transparent 
justification, courts would be obliged to publicly analyze on a case-by-
case basis the merits and demerits of privileging text or contrary 
legislative intent. Such analysis could generate principles more clearly 
specifying the circumstances under which text will presumptively 
trump conflicting legislative intent, and vice versa. These generalized 
principles could, over time and in a common-law fashion, congeal into 
new ordering principles that are incorporated into the law of 
interpretation. 
In the end, however, the strongest reasons for favoring 
transparent justification have nothing to do with improving the 
quality of decisions or the development of ordering principles. To be 
sure, these are significant side benefits that might accrue from a shift 
to transparent justification. But even ignoring these side benefits, one 
single consideration makes transparent justification superior to the 
avoidance maneuver: judicial candor. Simply stated, courts should be 
expected to offer transparent, honest, and complete descriptions of 
 
 184. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 58. 
 185. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also 
supra note 49. 
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the law of interpretation in their opinions. When courts deploy the 
avoidance maneuver, they fail to live up to this obligation. Instead, 
they inaccurately claim or imply that the law of interpretation grants 
certain injunctive interpretive principles priority over other injunctive 
interpretive principles. A presumption must always stand against 
misleading or incomplete descriptive accounts of legal norms in 
judicial opinions.186 Extraordinary circumstances might justify 
rebutting that presumption in some situations. The avoidance 
maneuver, however, is not reserved for extraordinary circumstances. 
It is standard operating procedure in legal opinions that deal with 
interpretive choice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has used Arlington Central’s classic conflict between 
statutory text and contrary legislative intent to explore fundamental 
features of the law of interpretation and the way courts address 
interpretive choice. Several central points have been advanced. First, 
the law of interpretation does not give courts much aid in resolving 
interpretive choices. The law of interpretation sanctions competing 
injunctive interpretive principles, but it offers no ordering principles 
for resolving conflicts among them. Thus, in Arlington Central, the 
law of interpretation left the Supreme Court free to choose between 
two opposing interpretations of equal legal validity and force. 
Ultimately, legally unconstrained judicial discretion driven by 
extralegal factors—rather than the law of interpretation—was 
decisive. 
Second, although the law of interpretation cannot resolve 
interpretive choices, courts nonetheless explicitly or implicitly claim 
that it can. In Arlington Central and related lower federal court cases, 
none of the opinions acknowledged the central role judicial discretion 
and extralegal factors had played in choosing between statutory text 
and conflicting legislative intent. Instead, the Justices applied the 
avoidance maneuver and claimed that the law of interpretation favors 
text over intent, or vice versa. In so doing, the Court misrepresented 
 
 186. See Idleman, supra note 164, at 1309 (“[T]he basic rule that judges ought to be candid 
in their opinions that they should neither omit their reasoning nor conceal their motives seems 
steadfastly to have held its ground.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions 
Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979) (arguing that Justices may not actually rely on reasons 
not stated in their opinions); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 731, 736–38 (1987) (arguing that candor is required in judicial opinions). 
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the law of interpretation and failed to publicly discuss the pivotal 
extralegal factors that had determined whether text or legislative 
intent ultimately prevailed. 
Third, courts deploy the avoidance maneuver to enable the 
reasoning in judicial opinions to adhere to rule-of-law values and 
thereby to preserve the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. 
Opinions responding to interpretive choices with the avoidance 
maneuver, however, necessarily misrepresent the law of 
interpretation. This misrepresentation diminishes any value derived 
from the appearance of adherence to the rule of law. 
Finally, given the problems inherent in the avoidance maneuver, 
this Article advances transparent justification as an alternative 
approach. Unlike the avoidance maneuver, transparent justification 
does not misrepresent the law of interpretation. Moreover, 
transparent justification would better constrain judicial discretion by 
pressing courts to publicly grapple with determinative extralegal 
factors. This, in turn, would also encourage courts to develop the 
ordering principles that this area of the law lacks. Any rule-of-law 
motivation for embracing the avoidance maneuver, or for rejecting 
transparent justification, is unconvincing. The mere fact that a court 
proclaims that the law of interpretation grants text precedence over 
intent, or vice versa, does not make it so. Nor does it persuade anyone 
who has reason to scrutinize judicial reasoning in cases involving 
interpretive choices. Moreover, admitting that the law of 
interpretation does not resolve an interpretive choice does not tell 
interested observers anything they do not already know. 
This Article began with a series of questions: What should a 
court do when the text of a statute strongly points to one statutory 
meaning, but strong evidence of legislative intent suggests an entirely 
different statutory meaning? Should a court follow the most natural 
reading of the text, even though it would upset the expectations of the 
enacting legislature? Or should a court adopt a reading that matches 
the clearly expressed intent and understanding of the enacting 
legislature, even if that reading is at odds with the statutory text? 
Ultimately, this Article does not counsel courts to favor either 
statutory text or legislative intent. Instead, it simply counsels against 
reflexive deployment of the avoidance maneuver. Courts have 
overestimated both the legitimacy-preserving effect of the avoidance 
maneuver and the legitimacy-eroding effect of transparent 
justification. In cases involving interpretive choices, legally 
unconstrained judicial discretion and extralegal factors necessarily 
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will be decisive. The mode of justification, whether it be avoidance or 
transparent justification, cannot alter this essential reality. At the very 
least, therefore, the avoidance maneuver should not be so universally 
and unquestioningly deployed. Courts should take transparent 
justification seriously. If they do, many courts will recognize the 
pitfalls of avoidance and the benefits of transparent justification. 
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